

SUPPLY AND STORAGE
JOINT-CROSS SERVICE GROUP

2005 BASE CLOSURE
AND
REALIGNMENT
REPORT

VOLUME XI



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IN REPLY
REFER TO D

May 6, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Recommendations

Enclosed please find the Supply & Storage Joint Cross-Service Group's (JCSG) recommendations for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 as required by Section 2903(c)(5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. I certify that the information contained in this JCSG report is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge. I look forward to working with the BRAC Commission as our recommendations proceed through the final portion of the BRAC process.

KEITH W. LIPPERT
Vice Admiral, SC, USN
Chairman, Supply & Storage Joint
Cross-Service Group

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Volume XI
Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Report (S&S JCSG)

I. Executive Summary

Introduction

The Director, Defense Logistics Agency chaired the Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group (S&S JCSG). It was originally chaired by the Joint Staff Director of Logistics until his retirement in August 2004. The group consisted of Flag and General Officer logisticians representing each Military Department, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (the Principals) comprising a deliberative body. A staff of military personnel, Department of Defense (DoD) civilians and private contractors supported the group. The S&S JCSG was chartered to conduct a comprehensive review of DoD's common business-oriented Supply and Storage logistics functions. Supply functions include such sub-functions as procurement and supply inventory management. Storage includes such sub-functions as receipt processing; storage and issue. Distribution was added as a distinct function by the S&S JCSG Principals to acknowledge the strategic role it plays in the storage and distribution process.

Responsibilities and Strategy

The overarching strategy of the S&S JCSG was “to pursue those logistics economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of operational forces as traditional forces and logistics processes transition to more joint and more expeditionary aspects.” Additionally, the S&S JCSG sought to transition traditional military logistics’ linear processes to a networked, force-focused construct which reduces both the number of sites and related excess capacity, while providing a more effective and efficient DoD logistics base.

One of the group’s major challenges was pursuing a course of action that acknowledged the S&S JCSG’s position as a “follower activity.” These “follower activity” conditions exist mainly where DLA storage and distribution activities/functions take place on a military installation primarily to support that installation’s specific industrial maintenance functions and infrastructure. As a result, the rationale for the continuation of the storage and distribution function on these installations sometimes depended on the BRAC 2005 actions of another JCSG or Military Department towards that particular installation. The exceptions to this are the Defense Distribution Center Susquehanna PA, and Defense Distribution Center San Joaquin CA. These two DLA installations are strategic distribution platforms that function independent of maintenance facilities as major distribution hubs.

As an example, if a BRAC 2005 scenario were developed by the Industrial JCSG to close, disestablish, or otherwise realign one of these industrial maintenance depots, the S&S JCSG was required to develop a BRAC 2005 scenario that reflected the appropriate supply, storage and distribution support. The same was also true if a Military Department wanted to recommend total closure of an installation, commonly referred to as “fence-line” closure. In this case S&S JCSG would again be required to develop an appropriate scenario in order to “enable” the Military Department’s recommendation.

The follower activity status and chartered areas of responsibility posed great challenges for the S&S JCSG. Too aggressive an approach in pursuing BRAC 2005 scenarios that impacted business-oriented logistics functions could inadvertently and adversely impact efficiencies of operational forces. Of course, this was unacceptable and had to be avoided. Consequently, the scenarios that S&S would eventually develop considered closing and realigning activities and their consequences, but primarily focused on business-related logistics economies and efficiencies that enhanced the effectiveness of operational forces; hence, the S&S overarching strategy.

This duality of scenario-impacting decisions made by other JCSGs and the Military Departments and transformation requirements demanded a heightened application of military judgment in S&S JCSG deliberations and scenario development. This placed a premium on the professional knowledge of the members of the JCSG. These senior level officials were acknowledged logistics experts within their respective Defense Components and were fully capable of arriving at accepted solutions where the application of military judgment was required. Their recent operational expenses in a theater of war contributed mightily to the deliberative process. Though military judgment played a key role in the S&S JCSG deliberative process, other tools were made available to and used by the S&S JCSG to develop its scenarios, make its analysis, and formulate recommendations.

Analysis Process

The S&S JCSG used the Optimization Model to the extent that the output of the model could be useful. Because supply and storage activities, in most cases, are tenant organizations on Defense Component installations, the JCSG made unique demands on the tool to enable an adequate assessment of its activities. The goal was to take full advantage of the tool and use its product to the extent that the model output could assist deliberations. As the computer-based Optimization Modeling was not the optimal tool set for achieving resolution for all of S&S decision set requirements, the S&S JCSG explored ancillary methodologies to expand business models with an eye towards business process improvements, better fiscal management and reducing excess infrastructure within the DoD. Certified capacity analysis and military value data were integral parts of the S&S decision-making process and were used in all sets of tools.

In the capacity analysis, S&S JCSG analyzed individual activity infrastructure by examining the productivity of key resource inputs, e.g., labor (man-hours) and actual space (office, warehouse, etc.). S&S assumed that a low rate of productivity for key resource inputs indicated either an inefficient use of resources and/or excess resource capacities. This would eventually become a very important issue in deliberations as the S&S JCSG considered scenarios where DoD could divest itself of excess infrastructure while maintaining operational efficiencies. In all cases, S&S focused on FY 2003 capacity data responses as being the most complete and current of the data collected. The S&S JCSG calculated capacity for all functions. Questions, formulas and filters were developed and tested for validity, adequacy and data quality. Questions were issued to installations in the form of a controlled data call and the installations responded in the form of certified data. Additional capacity information was later obtained from specific activities via a

data clarification effort based on the earlier capacity data call and by responses to targeted COBRA data calls during the scenario development phase.

For Military Value the S&S JCSG Principals derived functions, attributes, metrics, data call questions, and a quantitative scoring plan to array the relative Military Value of supply and storage activities across DoD using the assessed operational and physical characteristics outlined in BRAC 2005 selection criteria 1-4. Military Values were scored within categorical groupings of activities; Inventory Control Points (ICPs), Defense Distribution Depots (DDD) and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs).

For scenario development, the S&S JCSG followed a process that took into consideration transformational strategies, capacities and Military Value. The group identified strategy-based, data-supported business realignment scenarios that would advance jointness, achieve synergy, capitalize on technology, exploit best business practices, and/or minimize redundancy. This worked to pose and examine ideas that were in line with its overarching strategy, that were transformational, and that applied good business sense. After the scenarios were developed, selection criteria 5-8 were then assessed using DoD's standard procedures and/or models.

In accordance with BRAC statute and per Secretary of Defense guidance, the S&S JCSG assessed the relationship between the 20-year Force Structure Plan and the required supporting supply, storage and distribution capabilities. This analysis was conducted as a formal part of the S&S JCSG deliberative process. The correlation between the plan and actual supply, storage and distribution capabilities is indirect, making direct correlation and formal measurement of the impacts of recommendations difficult to ascertain. However, the group spent significant time evaluating, through the use of military judgment, the known and potential impact of recommendations on transformational initiatives and related future force structure. Additionally, the S&S JCSG considered the 20-year Force Structure Plan comments submitted to S&S JCSG by the Defense Components concerning supply, storage and distribution requirements.

The surge requirement was another important factor. At the outset of the process, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Base Realignment and Closure (hereafter referred to as OSD) position on surge was that its specific application of surge differed for each JCSG. OSD directed each JCSG to develop its own surge criteria. The S&S JCSG originally defined surge as operating 24 hours per day, seven days per week using 100 percent of existing facilities and equipment. This definition was included in the initial capacity data call released in January 2004. Specific questions were asked in that data call to capture surge data using this definition. Upon the development of Capacity Analysis methodology in the early spring of 2004, the group refined its surge definition. The S&S JCSG defined surge as using existing infrastructure resources to quickly respond to a short duration sudden increase in demand. Ten percent and 20 percent of system demand requirements were selected to conduct sensitivity analyses. These were considered reasonable short term increases on system demand that could be expected above and beyond the current increases being seen due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was the view of the S&S deliberative body that demand on the system as a result of the global war on terrorism, represented an extraordinary demand on surge. It was therefore assumed that 20 percent at the high end of surge was sufficient for the 20 year planning horizon associated with the Force Structure Plan. These percentages were repeated in all subsequent Capacity Analysis

reports. The two rates were used to show how increases in demand would affect capacity at different levels. Even after performance was calculated at these rates, excess capacity was still visible. This allowed S&S to ensure that the supply and storage system that remained after all BRAC actions were complete would be able to handle future surge demands.

As a result, the recommendations presented were a culmination of many factors. These included application of BRAC Criteria 1-8, meeting challenges as a “follower activity,” use of Capacity and Military Value data and other tools, assessment of the impacts of the 20-year Force Structure Plan and use of expert military judgment. This effort was enabled by the application of an overarching strategy with transformational ideas.

As a result, we believe we have arrived at a supply storage and distribution structure which enables us to more efficiently and effectively support our joint and coalition forces in a transformed global environment while at the same time introducing new world class business processes. These changes in sum are expected to have an immediate payback, an annual recurring savings of over 400 million dollars and an estimated Department savings (20-year Net Present Value) of about 5.5 billion dollars.

II. Organization and Charter

The S&S JCSG was chartered to conduct a review of a number of DoD common business-oriented logistics functions. It was responsible for a comprehensive review of assigned functions, evaluation of alternatives, and development and documentation of realignment and closure recommendations for submission to the Secretary of Defense. In developing its analytical process, the S&S JCSG established internal policies and procedures consistent with DoD policy memoranda, the 20-year Force Structure Plan, BRAC 2005 selection criteria and the requirements of Public Law 101-510, as amended.

a. Group Identity and Organization into Subgroups

The S&S JCSG, as a deliberative body, was comprised of a Chairman and other senior officers from each MilDep, DLA and JCS. It was supported by a dedicated working staff comprised of military personnel, DoD civilians and private contractor support. The S&S JCSG support staff was organized to manage and maintain the professional administrative and documentation requirements of the BRAC 2005 process, as well as perform BRAC 2005 scenario development and analysis for deliberation.

The S&S JCSG's approach divided the DoD supply and storage activities into three core functions: supply, storage and distribution. As data gathering and analysis began and as members became more aware of the total aspects of S&S JCSG areas of responsibility, it became apparent that although closely related, supply was a separate function from storage and distribution, and that storage and distribution functions were functionally interdependent. As a result, at the working group level, the S&S JCSG organized itself into two teams: one for supply/ICPs and the other for storage and distribution.

b. Functions Involved

Supply, Storage and Distribution activities are those separate units, organizations and activities that have as their primary mission, the provision of supply and/or storage and distribution services in support of customer organizations. These services include requisitioning, receiving, storing, issuing, and distributing supplies and materiel. The services also include materiel management, stock control, materiel acquisition, disposal and reutilization. Supply and Storage activities are further categorized as shown below:

- **Above Installation Activities:** Those Supply, Storage and Distribution activities that procure, hold and manage materiel not specific to individual operating units. These activities typically manage inventory which is held for sale, redistribution or production. National Inventory Control Points (ICPs) are included in this category.
- **Installation and Below Activities:** Those supply and storage activities that support organization level needs for supplies and materiel. Customer organizations of these activities are typically specific ships, squadrons, wings, battalions and repair shops.

Early on in the process, S&S JCSG Principals determined it would target data calls at the "above installation" activities. The "installation and below activities" processes varied tremendously

among the Services, particularly at these primarily operational and deployable units. The S&S Principals' position was that the Services' management of their operational and deployable units, their stocks, supplies and equipment were not within the purview of the S&S JCSG. Rather, the "above installation", or wholesale level of supply, storage and distribution functions (i.e., Inventory Control Points and Distribution Depots) were the more appropriate level of S&S involvement. This position is captured in Appendix F of the S&S JCSG Military Value Report located in Appendix B, Chapter V of this report. Later efforts looked at a narrow segment of activities, industrial, in a differing manner.

As previously indicated, three core functions were evaluated by the S&S JCSG. They were supply, storage and distribution. Core function attributes are as follows:

- Supply - (1) requirements determination, (2) requisitioning, (3) requisition processing, (4) stock control, (5) shelf-life management, (6) technical support and (7) quality assurance.
- Storage - (1) physical inventory management, (2) materiel handling, (3) materiel issuing, (4) warehousing, (5) packaging, (6) preserving and (7) quality assurance.
- Distribution - (1) shipping, (2) materiel handling, (3) traffic management, and (4) quality assurance.

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office locations were also under the purview of the S&S JCSG. However, they were not included in the S&S universe of activities for active BRAC 2005 determination. The JCSG deliberative body's position was that ongoing DRMO A-76 activity would achieve resolution before the commencement of BRAC 2005. The S&S JCSG's point was to avoid contaminating the ongoing A-76 process.

Each subgroup/team identified affected installations and developed attributes and metric questions related to these assigned functions. Questions were issued to each installation in the form of a controlled data call (see sections IIIa and IIIb for a more comprehensive review of Capacity Analysis and Military Value data call relationships, respectively). The initial data calls were OSD directed and of a general nature. The S&S JCSG extracted specific useable data for its purposes and ensured that the data was certified. Later, S&S issued more tailored data calls.

Responses in the form of certified data from each of these installations were used by each S&S subgroup to perform a capacity analysis for their functions. This analysis included a review of surge requirements. At the outset of the process, OSD delegated the development and application of surge requirements and definitions to each separate JCSG (see section IIIe). This was due to major differences in JCSG scope and mission. Taking this under advisement, the S&S JCSG determined that a 10-20 percent increase over current real world surge requirements by all four defense components and DLA was a reasonable surge factor.

c. Overarching Strategy

The S&S JCSG was guided by an overarching strategy construct: "to pursue those logistics economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of operational forces as traditional forces and logistics processes transition to more joint and more expeditionary aspects." Keeping in mind, some service warfighting constructs in transition (i.e., Army-maneuver brigades;

Navy/Marines-seabasing; Air Force-expeditionary air and space forces). S&S JCSG overall strategy would then be to transition traditional military logistics linear processes to a networked, force-focused construct that minimized the number of sites and reduced excess capacity while providing a more effective and efficient DoD logistics base. This then would be the backdrop from which the S&S JCSG proposed Recommendations would emanate.

III. Analytical Approach/Analysis

a. Capacity Analysis

Capacity Analysis data was collected via a general data call to all DoD activities targeted for BRAC 2005 review. The S&S JCSG then narrowed its scope to encompass those S&S activities that were above the installation level. For these activities the group focused on FY 2003 responses as being the most complete and current of the data collected. Although FY 2001 and FY 2002 data was collected during the capacity data call, those answers were only used in support of the Military Value effort. Additional capacity information was obtained from targeted activities via a data clarification effort based on the earlier capacity data call, and by responses from activities to targeted COBRA data calls during the scenario development and analysis phase of BRAC 2005.

The S&S JCSG analyzed individual activity infrastructure capacity by examining the productivity of key resource inputs (e.g., labor (man-hours) and actual space (office, warehouse, etc.)). The S&S JCSG assumed that a low rate of productivity for key resource inputs indicated either inefficient use of resources and/or excess resource capacities. The S&S JCSG measured capacity for each of its three basic functions (supply, storage and distribution) differently.

For the supply function S&S JCSG's capacity methodology used a standard product and standard resource productivity rates to determine an activity's excess capacity. This is a common commercial industry analytical practice used by FedEx, Delta, etc. to account for differences among activities that produce multiple products using multiple resources. This standard-product approach mitigated many of the confounding factors that stem from differences in product mix among S&S activities. Improper recognition of these factors would otherwise distort eventual activity-to-activity comparisons in support of BRAC infrastructure decisions by penalizing those activities that manage a more complex product mix (e.g., nuclear, aviation, etc.) as compared with those activities managing more commercially available less complex type items (e.g., food items, construction, etc.). Additional detail on the S&S JCSG standard-product approach and the resource mix that comprises the individual product follows below and is provided again in the Capacity Analysis Report, Appendix A, Chapter V of this report.

In the Storage and Distribution functions the S&S JCSG's methodology was simpler in approach. For storage, actual reported amounts of cubic and square footage of storage space were used to determine capacity. Storage resources are grouped into four like categories representing regular covered storage, special covered storage, open storage and liquid storage for Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) products. For distribution, available loading bays were compared to loading bays actually utilized by each strategic distribution depot to arrive at an excess determination.

In developing the capacity methodology the S&S JCSG believed an important attribute was to directly support modeling efforts. It was also important for the methodology to satisfy the Infrastructure Steering Group tasking that by-activity capacity figures be provided to determine an excess capacity total. These two factors were not necessarily mutually supportive and made the S&S JCSG capacity methodology development effort a more challenging event. During the

early stages of planning, S&S JCSG sought guidance as to definitions of key capacity terminology (i.e., maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, excess capacity and surge). Information provided from the OSD BRAC Office was that there would not be a single prescribed method to be used by all JCSG's, rather capacity terminology was to be defined by the individual JCSG in order to best address and present (their) functional activity analysis. The definitions developed by the S&S JCSG were discussed and approved by OSD BRAC representatives. Overall Capacity for the S&S JCSG was defined in terms of resources. The individual capacity definitions were as follows:

- Current Capacity. Total resources currently available to meet an activity's requirements for their functions computed as:
 - Supply. Un-weighted sum of available resources (labor and workspace).
 - Storage. Un-weighted sum of available cubic footage available for each covered storage category, square footage for open storage, and barrels of POL for wet tank storage.
 - Distribution. Maximum available loading bays for each strategic distribution depot.
- Current Usage. Minimum number of resources required to meet an activity's requirements for each function computed as:
 - Supply. Minimum number of resources (labor and workspace) needed to produce the required number of standard products in each supply labor category. (Utilization of standard product and resource productivity rates)
 - Storage. Un-weighted Sum of utilized cubic footage for each covered storage category, square footage utilized for open storage and barrels of POL for wet tank storage.
 - Distribution. Utilized loading bays for each strategic distribution depot.
- Excess Capacity. Difference between current capacity and current usage plus surge.
- Maximum Potential Capacity. For purposes of S&S Capacity considered unbounded. For each function the most significant limiting factor on capacity is the number of resources available. In the case of supply, an activity may hire additional resources or increase economic order quantities as required to accommodate increased supply demands. For storage resources can be arbitrarily increased to meet increased storage requirements through buying, leasing or building additional storage facilities. There are no limitations to distribution capacity that may not be remedied by the acquisition or use of additional resources (e.g., buying/leasing more trucks, utilizing additional airports or ports, running more trains, etc.)
- Surge. Given additional resources, any level of surge could eventually be met. Our discussion here of surge meets additional demand with no additional resources. No DoD surge requirement was available or provided for the S&S to factor into the capacity analysis. S&S JCSG felt that surge was an important factor in providing a sensitivity analysis as a means of mitigating risk that may arise from increasing requirements on systems with no additional infusion of resources. S&S believed this requirement-based definition of surge was more useful in determining true excess capacity than arbitrarily changing current usage resource levels to unsustainable levels. Surge, as it relates to each of the three functions is discussed in Chapter IIIe.

What follows is a more in depth discussion of the S&S JCSG's capacity analysis approach, broken down by its three functions (supply, storage and distribution).

Supply

Standard Supply Product. The S&S capacity analysis for the supply function uses a standard product and individual resource productivity rates to arrive at capacity determinations. Resource productivity is a measure of the annual output that a single unit of a resource is capable of producing. The standard supply product consists of a proportional mix of the major kinds of transactions that take place in the supply process. S&S used the activities' FY 2003 responses to the capacity data call to generate a mix of signed contracts, requisitions processed, inventory items managed, individual records managed, etc., to comprise the actual product's components. The S&S JCSG believes this amalgam was a more realistic representation of the many resources that are used by an activity in performing their Supply function. Use of a standard supply product allows for the many differences among the activities both in the types of product they produce and the mix of resources they possess and use to produce those products.

- The supply product should be viewed as a single standard unit of throughput. This unit of throughput represents the average mix of outputs of the supply process over the long run. It does not necessarily mirror the output of any particular supply operation.
- Many hours of different kinds of work would normally go into processing one of standard supply product (i.e., clerical, data entry, phone calls and faxes, estimating, accounting, financing, billing, report writing, credit checks, procurement advertising, etc.). We capture these in terms of their consumption of two types of standard resources using the following metrics:
 - standard full time equivalent (labor hours) consumed/year in processing each product and,
 - standard square feet of supply workspace (implicitly includes allocations of desk space, phones, aisle space, parking, overhead, utilities, etc.) consumed/year in processing each product.

Supply Resource Productivities. Resource productivity is a measure of the annual output that a single unit of a resource is capable of producing. S&S established common resource productivities to standardize resources for the supply function. To approximate an achievable ideal from our Capacity Data Call inputs, S&S employed an approach which utilized the top 50 percent of data from the activity population. S&S used the top 50 percent believing that it was an achievable, fair level of productivity that could be attained by all S&S activities. Using this data S&S computed the average productivity of that resource in performing the Supply function. By design, the resulting productivity figures represent an "above average" rate of what is achievable in routine actual practice by activities producing a wide range of throughputs with a variety of different work methods and resources.

The group built standardized resource productivity measures to determine: (1) how much excess capacity exists and (2) how it is distributed among the production resources when they are satisfying specific requirements for standard products. It effectively filters out the problematic differences in actual productivities that routinely stem from:

- Differences in the resource ages/conditions, imbedded technologies, and skill levels of resources
- Measurement errors
- Randomness in the actual performance of the function at activities
- Differences in the product mix for the function at the different activities

Implicit in this approach is an assumption that low resource productivity is generally symptomatic of activities with excess capacity. Less work is often spread out amongst a greater number of resources in order to spread the load. Also needed information technology upgrades may be lacking, underutilizing the existing resources (while it is acknowledged that more difficult workloads will have lower productivities, the wide range of activity productivities that make up the sample (50 percent of the total) will largely negate this effect). Conversely, it is assumed that high resource productivity is characteristic of activities with relatively little or no excess capacity. This averaging process produces the following desirable effects:

- Random influences present in the data tend to cancel. Unbiased measurement errors tend to cancel and the impacts of any residual biased measurement errors tend to be minimized.
- Differences in resource efficiencies at the different activities are largely eliminated.
- Differences in the actual product mixes at individual activities are averaged and tend to reflect the same component product mixes in the standard throughput(s) for each function. Thus more difficult and easier workloads tend to average out.

Resource Utilization Rate. Armed with the standard product and standard resource productivity rates we compute a utilization rate for each activity's resources. This number is the rate needed to produce the activity's portion of the requirement for their grouping. For example, the Inventory Control Point (ICP) located at Tinker AFB will be required to produce a certain portion of the overall requirement for all ICPs. This determines what percentage of each resource's possible production time is required to produce a unit of throughput.

Excess Resource Determination. S&S compared the resource utilization rate at the activity to S&S top 50 percent average then applied any observed difference to the number of resources of the activity to determine excess capacity (i.e., the resource excess or shortfall).

Storage

S&S' capacity analysis approach for the storage function focused on resource amounts associated with regular storage (general purpose, shed, transitory shelter), special storage (controlled humidity, refrigerated, flammable/HazMat, magazine, dry tank and secure), open (improved/unimproved) and barrels of POL for wet tank storage.

- Data call respondents' availability totals for each type of storage is considered current capacity and establishes the full available storage available (consideration of the condition of these facilities is incorporated into the S&S MilVal analysis).
- Actual storage space used is considered current usage and is as reported through the data call by the individual activity.

- Excess capacity determination for the storage function is current capacity minus current usage.

Distribution

In the S&S JCSG capacity analysis, loading bays are looked at for both their availability and their usage as reported in the S&S JCSG Capacity Data call.

- Data call respondents' availability of loading bays is considered current capacity and establishes the full distribution available (consideration of the condition of these facilities is incorporated into the S&S MilVal analysis).
- Actual loading bays used are considered current usage and are as reported through the data call by the individual activity.
- Excess capacity determination for the distribution function is current capacity minus current usage.

For final activity capacity calculations grouped by function, refer to the Capacity Report Appendixes in Chapter V, Appendix A of this report.

b. Military Value Analysis

In accordance with the OSD Policy Memorandum Two "BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles," dated October 14, 2004, the S&S JCSG was guided by the supply, service and maintenance principle: "The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces." In addition, the OSD Policy Memorandum: "2005 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria," dated January 4, 2005, provided the S&S JCSG with the four criteria required by BRAC law to be utilized in the analysis and determination of Military Value. The S&S JCSG Principals, through deliberative discourse, detailed the requirement of designing attributes, metrics, data call questions and a quantitative scoring plan to array the relative Military Value of supply and storage activities across the Department of Defense (DoD).

Analytical Approach

The S&S JCSG's approach divided the DoD supply and storage activities into three core functions: supply, storage, and distribution. The S&S JCSG's charter from OSD was to examine supply and storage functions. "Distribution" was added as a function by the Principals to acknowledge the strategic role distribution plays in the storage process and to acquire separate and distinct data for analysis in possible transformational distribution scenario recommendations. Distribution thus became a factor in the development of S&S recommendations. S&S crafted a methodology to analyze the Military Value of supply, storage and distribution activities by function around the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and American Samoa. The S&S JCSG conducted Military Value analysis within categorical groupings of activities, namely Inventory Control Points (ICPs), Defense Distribution Depots (DDD) and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs).

The S&S JCSG envisioned a strategically integrated, network-centric, supply chain with sufficient size and capability to provide reliable, flexible, efficient and operationally responsive combat support. The strategic integration of the supply, storage and distribution activities throughout the supply chain drives combat force sustainment and the accommodation of surge requirements supporting operational demands.

Two overarching factors heavily influenced the S&S JCSG's approach to analyzing Military Value: the diversity of the commodities managed throughout the DoD supply chain and current real world surge requirements by all four Services and DLA.

A detailed list of commodity type and product groups was included in the OSD BRAC Library and distributed with the data call. This list provided detailed guidance concerning how activities needed to sort their commodity inventories when answering the data call (commodity type and product groups may be found in the Military Value Final Report, Appendix C page 41) located in Chapter V, Appendix B of this report.

The S&S JCSG recognized the difficulty in comparing and evaluating "un-like" supply activities (i.e., Inventory Control Points). At the Principals' meeting dated January 21, 2004, it was determined that the complexity of items managed by an activity should be weighted to account for added difficulty in the management of certain items (e.g., aircraft, ground vehicles, troop support). Using military judgment, the S&S JCSG developed the "Complexity Factor" (C-factor) to adjust varied commodity types and product groups based upon their management. The C-factor was applied to all inventory management questions. The weighting of both the commodity types and product groups was developed and approved by the Principals. Each commodity type was analyzed for inventory management complexity and difficulty along the lines of legal restrictions, safety requirements, security requirements, technical aspects and sources of supply. The S&S JCSG Principals discussed, debated, voted, ranked and scored each area while populating two decision tables (one table for commodity types and another for product groups) before assigning weights. Commodity weights were utilized in the final scoring plan (see Appendix C, page 42, in Final Military Value Report for a detailed list of commodity types and product groups) located in Appendix B, Chapter V of this report.

To account for variations in operational tempo for each service and defense agency since 9/11 and obtain a more standard output, the S&S JCSG (Principals' deliberative discussions on February 12, 2004 and March 8, 2004) used their military judgment and determined that the most appropriate course of action would be for each activity to provide financial and performance data for three fiscal years (2001, 2002 and 2003). The data call responses then were averaged using all three years' data to account for the operational tempo variance. These averages were used to reduce the high variability caused by service and defense agency surge activity within each fiscal year's data.

For each of the Military Value criteria, the S&S JCSG developed "characteristics" specific to each core function (supply, storage, and distribution). Characteristics provided the foundation for the attributes, metrics, and questions developed by the S&S JCSG. Characteristics also represented the second-order weighting of Military Value discussed in the scoring plan.

Functions, attributes, metrics and questions developed were directed specifically to core function targeted activities. In addition to these three functionally-oriented characteristics, the S&S JCSG designed a fourth characteristic, “common,” to structurally capture functions common across all characteristics within a criterion (e.g., IT and personnel questions were the same for each core function, therefore, rather than repeat the question within each core function, common questions were asked once for all activities to answer). A more detailed discussion of characteristic, attribute, metric and question development may be found in Chapter V, Appendix B, of this report, “Final Military Value Report, including Results.”

The weighting of criteria constituted the first-order of Military Value prioritization. Criteria 1 and 3 are viewed as most indicative of Military Value and received equal Military Value weights of 35 percent. These two criteria respectively represent: 1) support and sustain current operations and 2) support and sustain future joint, expeditionary operations. Criterion 2 represented the Military Value of facilities and land and received a weight of 20 percent. Finally, criterion 4 represented cost and manpower implications and received a weight of 10 percent.

Results

The Military Value scoring results, required for this report, for each categorical group (Inventory Control Points (ICPs), Defense Distribution Depots (DDD)s and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs)) may be found in the Military Value Final Report, Appendix H (pages 118-122) located in Appendix B, Chapter V of this report.

An in-depth discussion, to include the scoring plan and results, may be found in Chapter V, Appendix B, of this report, “Final Military Value Report, including Results.”

c. Scenario Development

The development of BRAC 2005 scenarios by the S&S JCSG was guided by the overarching strategy construct discussed earlier: “to pursue those logistics economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of operational forces as traditional forces and logistics processes transition to more joint and more expeditionary aspects.” Additionally, the S&S strategic approach sought to “transition traditional military logistics’ linear processes to a networked, force-focused construct which minimizes the number of sites and reduces excess capacity while providing a more effective and efficient DoD logistics base.”

The S&S JCSG’s approach under this strategy was based on two premises: transformation and reduce excess capacity. The first premise, transformation, was expounded by the SecDef in his November 15, 2002 memorandum, “Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure.” Specifically, the SecDef stated “BRAC 2005 can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy”, and “I am confident we can produce BRAC recommendations that will advance transformation, combat effectiveness, and the efficient use of the taxpayer’s money.” In the same memorandum, he said “Joint Cross-Service teams will analyze the common business-oriented support functions and report their results through the ISG to the IEC.” So, with transformation being at what the S&S

JCSG considered at the core of its responsibility for BRAC 2005, business process realignments through transformational ideas and strategies were key to S&S scenario development.

The S&S JCSG took advantage of this first premise through what were coined transformational options” in a September 8, 2004 signed memorandum by the Chairman of the BRAC 2005 Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). S&S JCSG found four of these options to have the greatest import to its charter and strategy. They are listed below.

- Establish a consolidated multi-service supply, storage and distribution system that enhances the strategic deployment and sustainment of expeditionary joint forces worldwide. Focus the analysis on creating joint activities in heavy (US) DoD concentration areas (i.e., locations where more than one department is based and within close proximity to another).
- Privatize the wholesale storage and distribution processes from DoD activities that perform these functions.
- Migrate oversight and management of all Service depot level reparable to a single DoD agency/activity.
- Establish a single Inventory Control Point (ICP) within each Service or consolidate into joint ICPs.

The S&S JCSG used the insights gained through thorough examination of these areas as a springboard to help it develop transformational ideas and proposals. The S&S JCSG embarked along a path that materialized these “transformational options” into tangible business-oriented management actions. Among those measures that were ever-present considerations in scenario development and analysis were the assurance of business realignment process scenarios that (1) exploited jointness among service components and DLA, (2) avoided single point of failure, (3) made use of the private sector, and (4) made use of Military Value weighted scores where Military Value of supply, storage and distribution activities enabled and enhanced the overarching strategy construct.

S&S JCSG’s actions, under the first premise, required actual and tangible results. Consequently, S&S JCSG had under its area of responsibility a large number of DoD storage and distribution operations located at a number of military sites. These storage and distribution sites and pursuant supply functions which were also under the purview of the S&S JCSG, were being reported on in S&S capacity data. As analysis matured, the data began to show excess in both supply and storage and distribution operations. This confirmed S&S’ second premise; reduce excess DoD capacity.

As the S&S JCSG received and evaluated Capacity and Military Value Analysis data, S&S was able to develop ideas and scenarios that were in line with its overarching strategy and the two premises. As each idea became more substantive, the S&S JCSG pursued in earnest those ideas that showed the greatest promise of yielding the maximum amount of benefits in accordance with its charter, its strategy and SecDef guidance. At each step of the process, the DoD Inspector General validated the S&S data integration and certification process.

Subsequent Military Value assessments of each function at each installation were conducted using the installations certified responses to Military Value data call questions and BRAC 2005 selection criteria one through four. By statute, these four criteria are to receive priority consideration in the formulation of BRAC 2005 recommendations.

- Criterion one: The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
- Criterion two: The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
- Criterion three: The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
- Criterion four: The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other criteria (five through eight) addressed payback, economic impact, community infrastructure and environmental impacts. The team then identified strategy based-data supported realignment or closure scenarios which would advance the above criteria, jointness, reduce excess DoD infrastructure capacity, achieve synergy, capitalize on technology, exploit best business practices, and minimize redundancy. Once scenarios were developed the remaining selection criteria were assessed (Criteria five through eight) using DoD's standard procedures and/or models.

The S&S JCSG developed a total of 51 scenario proposals. These were then reviewed by the S&S JCSG Principals and reduced to 26 scenario proposals which were considered to be the most promising. After further analyses, these proposals were further reduced. Five recommendations were presented to the ISG and IEC. After a further integration process, three fully developed recommendations were submitted. These recommendations are responsible for a reduction of the physical footprint of DoD Defense Logistics Agency distribution warehouses by over 50% and savings to DoD of about 5.5 billion dollars in net present value while assuring the effectiveness and the efficiency of logistics processes.

d. Force Structure Plan

Overview. The S&S JCSG assessed the relationship between the 20-year force structure plan and the supporting supply and storage capabilities as a fundamental component of the BRAC 2005 process. S&S JCSG recommendations support each defense component's future force structure and enhance capabilities and initiatives presented in the plan. Additionally, the Department's ongoing shift from a threat to a capabilities-based approach for matching strategy-to-force structure was an integral part of JCSG strategy discussions at both the senior field grade officer (working group) and Flag and General Officer Principal level.

JCSG Approach. In accordance with BRAC 2005 statute and per Secretary of Defense guidance, the S&S JCSG assessed the relationship between the force structure plan and required

supporting supply and storage capabilities. This analysis was conducted as a formal part of the S&S JCSG deliberative process. The correlation between the force structure plan and actual supply and storage capabilities is indirect, making direct correlation and formal measurement of the impacts of recommendations difficult to ascertain. However, the group spent significant time evaluating, through the use of military judgment, the known and potential impact of recommendations on transformational initiatives and related future force structure. Early in the process, the S&S JCSG Chairman recognized that a thorough understanding of future force structure and transformational initiatives is a prerequisite for candidate proposal analysis. On October 14, 2004, the JCSG Chairman requested, via formal memorandum, that each Military Department and the Defense Logistics Agency provide a written impact assessment of the 20-year force structure plan on their required supply and storage capabilities. These individual assessments served as reference tools informing JCSG membership during recommendation development and actual deliberative sessions.

Recommendation Impacts

Supply, Storage and Distribution Management Reconfiguration: This recommendation supports the force structure plan's call for relatively flat (Service) end-strengths and funding levels by reducing personnel and facility requirements. This is accomplished by reconfiguring wholesale storage and distribution around regional distribution platforms and eliminating redundant supply and storage functions at industrial installations. Additionally, this recommendation directly supports the Defense Strategy by facilitating more flexible, adaptive and decisive joint capabilities by enhancing strategic flexibility via multiple platforms.

Commodity Management Privatization: This recommendation supports the force structure plan's call for relatively flat (Service) end-strengths and funding levels by reducing personnel and facility requirements required for the acquisition, materiel management, storage and distribution of tires, packaged petroleum oil and lubricants and compressed gasses.

Depot Level Repairable Procurement Management Consolidation: This recommendation supports the 20-year force structure plan's call for relatively flat (Service) end-strengths and funding levels by reducing personnel and facility requirements. This is accomplished by transferring procurement and related procurement support functions associated with the management of depot level repairables and all functions associated with consumable items to include consumable item materiel to the Defense Logistics Agency. An ancillary benefit of this recommendation is that it advances transformation by leveraging the total buying power of DoD within a single organization while mitigating readiness risk. It provides the foundation to assess new operating concepts that employ new organizational constructs, capabilities and doctrine for providing joint supply and storage capabilities.

e. Surge Requirements

In accordance with OSD Policy Memo Seven dated January 4, 2005, surge needed to be considered in each stage of the BRAC process.

In stage one, capacity analysis; the S&S JCSG had to assess maximum potential excess capacity that would be present to absorb surge demand. Within the S&S JCSG maximum

potential capacity was defined to be unbounded. There is no limit to the number of warehouses that could be let, or contractors hired to help process the administrative workload. Thus the supply and storage system will always have the capacity to surge.

In stage two, Military Value analysis, criteria one and three required some consideration of surge. In establishing the JCSG's attributes and weighing those attributes, we ensured that surge was appropriately reflected in our Military Value analysis.

In stage three, scenario analysis, the JCSG needed to ensure consideration of "difficult to reconstitute" assets, which consist of infrastructure that is not readily commercially available for military use. These assets go beyond physical structures to include elements of topography and the ability to use the assets as required to fulfill a military need. As supply and storage infrastructure is inherently commercial and available on the commercial market, the S&S JCSG did not have any "difficult to reconstitute" assets to consider.

OSD's position on surge throughout the BRAC 2005 process was that the specific application of it differed for each JCSG; therefore they left it up to each JCSG to define and apply. The S&S JCSG originally defined surge as operating 24 hours per day, seven days per week using 100 percent of existing facilities and equipment (Capacity Report dated September 24, 2003). This definition was included in the initial capacity data call released in January 2004. Specific questions were asked in that data call to capture surge data using this definition (in view of the changing definition of surge discussed below, none of these questions were subsequently used in Capacity Analysis).

Upon the development of Capacity Analysis methodology in the early spring of 2004, the group moved to a new definition of surge. "The S&S JCSG used the term *surge* to mean using *existing infrastructure resources* to quickly respond to a *short duration sudden increase in demand*." (Capacity Report, Appendix A, Chapter V dated June 17, 2004). With this definition of surge it was important to model increasing the demand on the existing system by some percentage. As reasonable short term increases on system demand that could be expected above and beyond the current increases being seen due to the global war on terrorism, a 10 percent and 20 percent surge rates were selected. The group selected these percentages because they believed they were prudent standards and then confirmed them by repeated usage in all subsequent reports. The two rates were used to show how increases in demand would affect capacity at different levels. This in turn allowed us to ensure that the supply and storage system that remained after all BRAC 2005 actions were complete would be able to handle future surge demands.

IV. Recommendations

a. Supply, Storage and Distribution Management Reconfiguration

Recommendation: Realign Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, by disestablishing the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH. Relocate the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, PA, hereby designated the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Tobyhanna Army Depot to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Tobyhanna Army Depot, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Station Norfolk, VA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Norfolk Naval Base and at Norfolk Naval Shipyard to support shipyard operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Norfolk Naval Shipyard operations, maintenance and production, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, by relocating the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Richmond, VA, to the Susquehanna Strategic Distribution Platform. Retain the minimum necessary storage and distribution functions and associated inventories at Defense Distribution Depot Richmond, VA to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point.

Realign Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC, to support depot operations, maintenance and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Naval Air Depot Cherry Point, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins, GA, hereby designated the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA, by consolidating the supply, storage and distribution functions and associated inventories supporting depot operations, maintenance, and production at

the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center with the supply, storage, and distribution functions at the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Maintenance Center Albany, GA, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support the Maintenance Center Albany, GA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support the Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Anniston Army Depot, AL, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Anniston Army Depot, AL, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Anniston Army Depot, AL, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robins Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Corpus Christi, TX, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, hereby designated the Oklahoma City Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Tinker AFB, OK, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories supporting depot operations, maintenance, and production at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center with the supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories at the Oklahoma City Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Hill AFB, UT, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Hill, UT, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support the Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, CA, hereby designated the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Station Bremerton, WA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Puget Sound, WA, with all other supply, storage and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, WA, to support shipyard operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, WA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Naval Station San Diego, CA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot, San Diego, CA, with all other supply, storage and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA, to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Realign Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow CA, by consolidating the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Barstow CA, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at the Maintenance Center Barstow, CA to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retain the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories at Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA that are required to support the Maintenance Center Barstow, CA, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform.

Justification: This recommendation achieves economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of logistics support to operational joint and expeditionary forces. It reconfigures the Department's wholesale storage and distribution infrastructure to improve support to the future force, whether home-based or deployed. It transforms existing logistics processes by creating four CONUS support regions, with each having one Strategic Distribution Platform and multiple Forward Distribution Points. Each Strategic Distribution Platform will be equipped with state-of-the-art consolidation, containerization and palletization capabilities, and the entire structure will provide for in-transit cargo visibility and real-time accountability. Distribution Depots, no longer needed for regional supply, will be realigned as Forward Distribution Points

and will provide dedicated receiving, storing and issuing functions solely in support of on-base industrial customers such as maintenance depots, shipyards and air logistics centers. Forward Distribution Points will consolidate all supply and storage functions supporting industrial activities, to include those internal to depots and shipyards, and those at any intermediate levels that may exist. This consolidation eliminates unnecessary redundancies and duplication, and streamlines supply and storage processes.

In addition to the actions in this recommendation, the Department is abolishing the Defense Distribution Depot at Red River Army Depot. This action is included as part of a recommendation to close the Red River Army Depot installation. The recommendation to fully close the installation achieves the objective of disestablishing the Defense Distribution Depot and is consistent with the intent of this recommendation.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$192.749M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department of Defense during the implementation period is a savings of \$1,047.329M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$203.209M with a payback expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$2,925.816M.

Economic Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in the maximum potential job reductions (direct and indirect) over the 2006-2011 period, as follows:

Region of Influence	Direct Job Reductions	Indirect Job Reductions	Total Job Reductions	% of Economic Area Employment
Columbus, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area	21	16	37	Less than 0.1%
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area	86	60	146	Less than 0.1%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC Metropolitan Statistical Area	307	426	733	Less than 0.1%
Richmond, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area	47	36	83	Less than 0.1%
New Bern, NC Micropolitan Statistical Area	10	9	19	Less than 0.1%
Albany, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area	40	31	71	Less than 0.1%
Jacksonville, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area	29	40	69	Less than 0.1%

Anniston-Oxford, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area	90	67	157	0.26%
Corpus Christi, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area	92	133	225	0.1%
Ogden-Clearfield, UT Metropolitan Statistical Area	64	62	126	Less than 0.1%
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA Metropolitan Statistical Area	59	62	121	0.1%
Riverside-San Bernadino-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	10	8	18	Less than 0.1%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	3	3	6	Less than 0.1%

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates there are no issues regarding the ability of infrastructure of communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impacts: Additional operations at Tinker may impact wetlands and may restrict operations. At Susquehanna and San Joaquin, permits may be required for new boilers, generators and paint booths. Increased solid and hazardous waste may also require new permits. Drinking water consumption will increase at these two locations and MILCON projects require storm water permits. This recommendation has no impact on cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; or threatened and endangered species or critical habitat. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$719,000 for waste management and environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Attachment 1 Supporting Information

Competing Recommendations: None.

Support to 20-Year Force Structure Plan: This recommendation supports the 20-Year Force Structure Plan, which calls for end-strengths, mix of units and funding levels to remain relatively flat and stable. The recommendation eliminates excess wholesale storage capacity, over and above that needed to support the future force structure. It retains sufficient storage capacity to satisfy surge requirements, mobilization requirements, and requirements for redeployment and retrograde of equipment. Just as important, this recommendation reconfigures wholesale storage and infrastructure in CONUS to support the Department's plans to home-base units currently based permanently overseas. This recommendation also reduces unnecessary supply and storage resources at industrial installations, and streamlines support to depots and shipyards at reduced operating costs.

Military Value Analysis Results: This recommendation allocates Strategic Distribution Platforms (SDPs) on a regional basis. The scenario has four CONUS regions, with each region having one SDP and several FDPs supporting industrial facilities. Listed below are the quantitative military value scores and rankings for all the distribution depots considered in developing this recommendation. Distribution depots in the same regions were compared to select the best one to serve as the regional SDP. Selection was based on quantitative military value scores, storage capacity, and geographical location. Available storage capacity determines the extent of military construction required, and location influences capabilities to achieve acceptable customer wait times. Even though Warner Robins, Oklahoma City, and San Joaquin did not have the highest quantitative military value scores in their respective regions, it was the military judgment of the Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group that, because of their storage capacities and locations, they provided the highest overall military value to the Department as SDPs.

Defense Distribution Depots	Raw MV Score	Regional MV Ranking
Region 1. North-Eastern US & European Theater		
Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna (SDP)	0.4092	1
Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk	0.4043	2
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna	0.2809	3
Defense Distribution Depot Richmond	0.2770	4
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus	0.2239	5
Region 2. South-Eastern US		
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville	0.3527	1
Defense Distribution Depot Anniston	0.3235	2
Defense Distribution Depot Albany	0.2661	3
Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins (SDP)	0.2412	4
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point	0.2163	5
Region 3. Central US		
Defense Distribution Depot Red River	0.3362	1

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City (SDP)	0.3239	2
Defense Distribution Depot Corpus Christi	0.2269	3
Region 4. Western US & Pacific Theater		
Defense Distribution Depot Hill	0.4687	1
Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin (SDP)	0.4163	2
Defense Distribution Depot Puget Sound	0.2636	3
Defense Distribution Depot San Diego	0.2524	4
Defense Distribution Depot Barstow	0.2505	5
Other. Non-CONUS		
Defense Distribution Depot Pearl Harbor	0.2179	1

Capacity Analysis Results: Capacities for storage and distribution functions are arrayed below for each of the Defense Distribution Depots considered in this analysis. Also presented are the capacity figures for Defense Distribution Depot Pearl Harbor.

S&S Activity	Regular Covered Storage (cu ft)	Special Covered Storage (cu ft)	Open Storage (sq ft)	No. Loading Docks
Defense Distribution Depot Albany				
Current Capacity	12,994,000	1,882,000	52,000	60
Utilized Capacity	4,635,000	587,000	0	26
Maximum Potential Capacity	12,994,000	1,882,000	52,000	60
Capacity Available to Surge	8,359,000	1,295,000	52,000	34
Capacity Required to Surge	927,000	117,400	10,400	5
Excess Capacity	8,359,000	1,295,000	52,000	34
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	7,432,000	1,177,600	41,600	29
Defense Distribution Depot Anniston				
Current Capacity	13,550,000	2,123,000	2,550,000	28
Utilized Capacity	7,295,999	958,000	1,827,000	57
Maximum Potential Capacity	13,550,000	2,123,000	2,550,000	28
Capacity Available to Surge	6,254,001	1,165,000	723,000	-29
Capacity Required to Surge	1,459,200	191,600	365,400	11
Excess Capacity	6,254,001	1,165,000	723,000	-29
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	4,794,801	973,400	357,600	-40
Defense Distribution Depot Barstow				
Current Capacity	10,848,000	81,000	1,209,000	20
Utilized Capacity	3,551,000	32,000	186,999	15
Maximum Potential Capacity	10,848,000	81,000	1,209,000	20
Capacity Available to Surge	7,297,000	49,000	1,022,001	5
Capacity Required to Surge	710,200	6,400	37,400	3
Excess Capacity	7,297,000	49,000	1,022,001	5

Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	6,586,800	42,600	984,601	2
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point				
Current Capacity	3,091,000	11,000	178,000	22
Utilized Capacity	2,022,001	7,999	105,000	10
Maximum Potential Capacity	3,091,000	11,000	178,000	22
Capacity Available to Surge	1,068,999	3,001	73,000	12
Capacity Required to Surge	404,400	1,600	20,999	2
Excess Capacity	1,068,999	3,001	73,000	12
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	664,599	1,401	52,001	10
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus				
Current Capacity	9,018,000	0	0	26
Utilized Capacity	3,236,000	0	0	14
Maximum Potential Capacity	9,018,000	0	0	26
Capacity Available to Surge	5,782,000	0	0	22
Capacity Required to Surge	647,200	0	0	1
Excess Capacity	5,782,000	0	0	22
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	5,134,800	0	0	21
Defense Distribution Depot Corpus Christi				
Current Capacity	1,191,000	977,000	123,000	16
Utilized Capacity	716,001	695,997	61,000	6
Maximum Potential Capacity	1,191,000	977,000	123,000	16
Capacity Available to Surge	474,999	281,003	62,000	10
Capacity Required to Surge	143,200	139,199	12,200	1
Excess Capacity	474,999	281,003	62,000	10
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	331,799	141,804	49,800	9
Defense Distribution Depot Hill				
Current Capacity	12,888,000	320,000	543,000	106
Utilized Capacity	9,164,998	208,332	508,000	53
Maximum Potential Capacity	12,888,000	320,000	543,000	106
Capacity Available to Surge	3,723,002	111,668	35,000	53
Capacity Required to Surge				
Excess Capacity	3,723,002	111,668	35,000	53
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	1,890,002	70,002	-66,600	42
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville				
Current Capacity	4,284,000	215,000	97,000	16
Utilized Capacity	3,685,999	169,001	78,000	12
Maximum Potential Capacity	4,284,000	215,000	97,000	16
Capacity Available to Surge	598,001	45,999	19,000	4
Capacity Required to Surge	737,200	33,800	15,600	2
Excess Capacity	598,001	45,999	19,000	4
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-139,199	12,199	3,400	2

Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk				
Current Capacity	16,854,000	1,905,000	127,000	48
Utilized Capacity	8,897,001	339,001	9,000	12
Maximum Potential Capacity	16,854,000	1,905,000	127,000	48
Capacity Available to Surge	7,956,999	1,565,999	118,000	36
Capacity Required to Surge	1,779,400	67,800	1,800	2
Excess Capacity	7,956,999	1,565,999	118,000	36
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	6,177,599	1,498,199	116,200	34
Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City				
Current Capacity	16,641,000	330,000	544,000	64
Utilized Capacity	13,701,000	243,002	452,000	21
Maximum Potential Capacity	16,641,000	330,000	544,000	64
Capacity Available to Surge	2,940,000	86,998	92,000	43
Capacity Required to Surge	2,740,200	48,600	90,400	4
Excess Capacity	2,940,000	86,998	92,000	43
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	199,800	38,398	1,600	39
Defense Distribution Depot Pearl Harbor				
Current Capacity	3,376,000	291,000	89,000	58
Utilized Capacity	2,667,999	151,000	24,000	169
Maximum Potential Capacity	3,376,000	291,000	89,000	58
Capacity Available to Surge	708,001	140,000	65,000	-111
Capacity Required to Surge	533,600	30,200	15,600	34
Excess Capacity	708,001	140,000	65,000	-111
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	174,401	109,800	49,400	-145
Defense Distribution Depot Puget Sound				
Current Capacity	1,902,000	25,000	15,000	44
Utilized Capacity	771,999	19,999	5,001	20
Maximum Potential Capacity	1,902,000	25,000	15,000	44
Capacity Available to Surge	1,130,001	5,001	9,999	24
Capacity Required to Surge	154,400	4,000	1,000	4
Excess Capacity	1,130,001	5,001	9,999	24
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	975,601	1,001	8,999	20
Defense Distribution Depot Red River				
Current Capacity	17,514,000	6,641,000	1,868,000	34
Utilized Capacity	13,431,999	4,630,997	1,262,999	9
Maximum Potential Capacity	17,514,000	6,641,000	1,868,000	34
Capacity Available to Surge	4,082,001	2,010,003	605,001	25
Capacity Required to Surge	2,686,400	926,199	252,600	2
Excess Capacity	4,082,001	2,010,003	605,001	25
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	1,395,601	1,083,804	352,401	23

Defense Distribution Depot Richmond				
Current Capacity	24,005,000	3,016,000	862,000	18
Utilized Capacity	11,016,999	2,191,080	46,001	9
Maximum Potential Capacity	24,005,000	3,016,000	862,000	18
Capacity Available to Surge	12,988,001	825,000	815,999	9
Capacity Required to Surge	2,203,400	438,200	9,200	2
Excess Capacity	12,988,001	825,000	815,999	9
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	10,784,601	386,800	806,799	7
Defense Distribution Depot San Diego				
Current Capacity	9,062,000	614,000	110,000	100
Utilized Capacity	6,253,001	485,001	81,000	50
Maximum Potential Capacity	9,062,000	614,000	110,000	100
Capacity Available to Surge	2,808,999	128,999	29,000	50
Capacity Required to Surge	1,250,600	97,000	16,200	10
Excess Capacity	2,808,999	128,999	29,000	50
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	1,558,399	31,999	12,800	40
Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin				
Current Capacity	43,120,000	1,239,000	555,000	64
Utilized Capacity	31,853,000	772,001	248,000	13
Maximum Potential Capacity	43,120,000	1,239,000	555,000	64
Capacity Available to Surge	11,267,000	466,999	307,000	51
Capacity Required to Surge	6,370,600	154,400	49,600	3
Excess Capacity	11,267,000	466,999	307,000	51
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	4,896,400	312,599	257,400	48
Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna				
Current Capacity	53,154,000	2,064,000	259,000	244
Utilized Capacity	46,618,000	1,988,998	68,160	393
Maximum Potential Capacity	53,154,000	2,064,000	259,000	244
Capacity Available to Surge	6,536,000	75,002	190,840	-149
Capacity Required to Surge	9,323,600	397,800	17,040	79
Excess Capacity	6,536,000	75,002	190,840	-149
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-2,787,600	-322,798	173,800	-228
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna				
Current Capacity	15,158,000	238,000	901,000	22
Utilized Capacity	10,612,000	163,000	620,999	7
Maximum Potential Capacity	15,158,000	238,000	901,000	22
Capacity Available to Surge	4,546,000	75,000	280,001	15
Capacity Required to Surge	2,122,400	32,600	124,200	1
Excess Capacity	4,546,000	75,000	280,001	15
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	2,423,600	42,400	155,801	14

Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins				
Current Capacity	16,921,000	1,389,000	292,000	52
Utilized Capacity	13,647,000	1,106,000	295,999	45
Maximum Potential Capacity	16,921,000	1,389,000	292,000	52
Capacity Available to Surge	3,274,000	283,000	-3,999	7
Capacity Required to Surge	2,729,400	221,200	59,200	9
Excess Capacity	3,274,000	283,000	-3,999	7
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	544,600	61,800	-63,199	-2

b. Commodity Management Privatization

Recommendation: Realign Detroit Arsenal, MI, by relocating the supply contracting function for tires to the Inventory Control Point at Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and disestablishing all other supply functions for tires.

Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT, as follows: relocate the supply contracting function for tires to the Inventory Control Point at Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH; disestablish all other supply functions for tires; and disestablish the storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases.

Realign Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, PA, by relocating the supply contracting function for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants to the Inventory Control Point at Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, and disestablishing all other supply functions for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants.

Realign Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA by disestablishing storage and distribution functions for tires, and the supply, storage, and distribution functions for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases. Retain the supply contracting function for packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases.

Realign Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA, Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, PA, Naval Station Norfolk, VA, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA, Robins Air Force Base, GA, Anniston Army Depot, AL, Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX, Naval Station Bremerton, WA, Naval Station San Diego, CA, Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA, Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, CA, and Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI, by disestablishing storage and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases at each location.

Justification: This recommendation achieves economies and efficiencies that enhance the effectiveness of logistics support to forces as they transition to more joint and expeditionary operations. This recommendation disestablishes the wholesale supply, storage, and distribution functions for all tires; packaged petroleum, oils and lubricants; and compressed gases used by the Department of Defense, retaining only the supply contracting function for each commodity. The Department will privatize these functions and will rely on private industry for the performance of supply, storage, and distribution of these commodities. By doing so, the Department can divest itself of inventories and can eliminate infrastructure and personnel associated with these functions. This recommendation results in more responsive supply support to user organizations and thus adds to capabilities of the future force. The recommendation provides improved support during mobilization and deployment, and the sustainment of forces when deployed worldwide. Privatization enables the Department to take advantage of the latest technologies, expertise and business practices which translates to improved support to customers at less cost. It centralizes management of tires; packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants; and compressed gases and eliminates unnecessary duplication of functions within the Department. Finally, this

recommendation supports transformation by privatizing the wholesale storage and distribution processes from DoD activities.

In addition to the actions described in this recommendation, the Department is also disestablishing storage and distribution functions for tires, packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and compressed gases at Red River Army Depot, TX. The storage and distribution functions at this additional location are now being disestablished as part of recommendation for the full closure of the Red River Army Depot installation. The recommendation to close the installation fully supports all objectives intended by this recommendation.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$6.379M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$333.747M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$43.777M with a payback expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$735.854M.

Economic Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in the maximum potential job reductions (direct and indirect) over the 2006-2011 period, as follows:

Economic Region of Influence	Direct Job Reductions	Indirect Job Reductions	Total Job Reductions	% of Employment
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area	16	15	31	Less than 0.1%
Richmond, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area	32	25	57	Less than 0.1%
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA Metropolitan Statistical Area	1	1	2	Less than 0.1%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area	7	10	17	Less than 0.1%
Oklahoma City, OK Metropolitan Statistical Area	1	1	2	Less than 0.1%
Stockton, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	31	20	51	Less than 0.1%
Honolulu, HI Metropolitan Statistical Area	1	1	2	Less than 0.1%
Anniston-Oxford, AL Metropolitan Statistical	1	1	2	Less than 0.1%

Area				
Detroit-Livonia- Dearborn, MI Metropolitan Division	30	19	49	Less than 0.1%

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installation in this recommendation.

Environmental Impacts: This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$200,000 for waste management and environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Attachment 1 Supporting Information

Competing Recommendation: No other scenarios compete with the disestablishment and privatization of supply, storage and distribution functions for tires; packaged petroleum, oils and lubricants; and compressed gases.

Support to 20-Year Force Structure Plan: This recommendation supports the 20-Year Force Structure Plan which calls for relatively flat end-strengths, units and funding levels. Privatization reduces current personnel and facilities requirements needed for the acquisition, materiel management, storage and distribution of tires; packaged petroleum, oils and lubricants; and compressed gases. The privatization of these commodities will result in more responsive supply support to the future force at greatly reduced costs to the Department.

Military Value Analysis Results: Quantitative military value scores and rankings are provided in the table below for each of the Supply and Storage Activities that perform functions described in this recommendation. Note that for military value analysis, Supply and Storage Activities were grouped into categories so like organizations could be compared to one and other. This recommendation includes two categories of activities, Inventory Control Points (ICPs) and Defense Distribution Depots, and the table provides military values for activities in both categories. The military values for activities in different categories, however, cannot be directly compared.

For this recommendation, relative quantitative military values are not relevant, because all functions relating to tires; packaged petroleum, oils and lubricants; and compressed gases are being privatized. All activities that perform supply, storage or distribution of these commodities, or any combination of these functions will have these functions privatized.

Military Value Scores and Rankings		
Name of Activity	MV Score	MV Ranking
Inventory Control Points (ICPs)		
Ogden Air Logistics Center	0.2090	1
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM)	0.2035	2
NAVICP - Philadelphia	0.1994	3
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center	0.1956	4
Defense Supply Center Columbus	0.1909	5
NAVICP - Mechanicsburg	0.1884	6
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center	0.1855	7
Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM)	0.1793	8
Defense Supply Center Richmond	0.1778	9
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany	0.1770	10
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)	0.1701	11
TACOM - Rock Island	0.1666	12
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia	0.1588	13

Lackland Air Force Base - ICP	0.0853	14
CECOM - CSLA	0.0722	15
TACOM - Natick	0.0301	16
Defense Distribution Depots		
Defense Distribution Depot Hill	0.4687	1
Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin	0.4163	2
Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna	0.4092	3
Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk	0.4043	4
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville	0.3527	5
Defense Distribution Depot Red River	0.3362	6
Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City	0.3239	7
Defense Distribution Depot Anniston	0.3235	8
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna	0.2809	9
Defense Distribution Depot Richmond	0.2770	10
Defense Distribution Depot Albany	0.2661	11
Defense Distribution Depot Puget Sound	0.2636	12
Defense Distribution Depot San Diego	0.2524	13
Defense Distribution Depot Barstow	0.2505	14
Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins	0.2412	15
Defense Distribution Depot Corpus Christi	0.2269	16
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus	0.2239	17
Defense Distribution Depot Pearl Harbor	0.2179	18
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point	0.2163	19

Capacity Analysis Results: The table below presents the capacities for all activities performing functions described in this recommendation. For ICPs, supply capacities are presented. For Defense Distribution Depots, storage and distribution capacities are listed.

Supply Capacities - Inventory Control Points (ICPs)				
ICPs	Purchasing/ Budgeting Labor (FTEs)	Supply Labor (FTEs)	Technical Labor (FTEs)	Work Space (sq ft)
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany				
Current Capacity	7	231	184	626,043
Utilized Capacity	45	72	33	31,578
Maximum Potential Capacity	7	231	184	626,043
Capacity Available to Surge	-38	159	151	594,465
Capacity Required to Surge	9	15	7	6,316
Excess Capacity	-38	159	151	594,465
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-47	144	144	588,149

Defense Supply Center Columbus				
Current Capacity	723	528	637	307,230
Utilized Capacity	531	854	391	373,318
Maximum Potential Capacity	723	528	637	307,230
Capacity Available to Surge	192	-326	246	-66,088
Capacity Required to Surge	106	171	78	74,663
Excess Capacity	192	-326	246	-66,088
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	86	-497	168	-140,751
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia				
Current Capacity	1,044	891	365	253,699
Utilized Capacity	1,143	1,837	841	803,037
Maximum Potential Capacity	1,044	891	365	253,699
Capacity Available to Surge	-99	-947	-475	-549,338
Capacity Required to Surge	228	367	168	160,607
Excess Capacity	-99	-947	-475	-549,338
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-327	-1,314	-643	-709,945
Defense Supply Center Richmond				
Current Capacity	758	989	188	437,318
Utilized Capacity	424	681	312	297,679
Maximum Potential Capacity	758	989	188	437,318
Capacity Available to Surge	334	308	-124	139,639
Capacity Required to Surge	84	136	62	59,535
Excess Capacity	334	308	-124	139,639
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	250	172	-186	80,104
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)				
Current Capacity	115	363	766	155,216
Utilized Capacity	11	18	8	7,691
Maximum Potential	115	363	766	155,216

Capacity				
Capacity Available to Surge	104	345	758	147,525
Capacity Required to Surge	2	3	2	1,538
Excess Capacity	104	345	758	147,525
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	102	342	756	145,987
CECOM - CSLA				
Current Capacity	3	85	27	37,500
Utilized Capacity	9	14	7	6,296
Maximum Potential Capacity	3	85	27	37,500
Capacity Available to Surge	-6	71	20	31,204
Capacity Required to Surge	2	3	1	1,260
Excess Capacity	-6	71	20	31,204
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-8	68	19	29,944
Communications - Electronics Command (CECOM)				
Current Capacity	90	325	474	520,547
Utilized Capacity	12	20	9	8,783
Maximum Potential Capacity	90	325	474	520,547
Capacity Available to Surge	78	305	465	511,764
Capacity Required to Surge	3	4	2	1,757
Excess Capacity	78	305	465	511,764
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	75	301	463	510,007
Ogden Air Logistics Center				
Current Capacity	252	414	220	162,648
Utilized Capacity	24	38	18	16,726
Maximum Potential Capacity	252	414	220	162,648
Capacity Available to Surge	228	376	202	145,922
Capacity Required to Surge	5	8	3	3,345
Excess Capacity	228	376	202	145,922
Excess Capacity at 20%	223	368	199	142,577

Surge				
Lackland AFB - ICP				
Current Capacity	0	16	0	810
Utilized Capacity	N/A	7	N/A	3,171
Maximum Potential Capacity	0	16	0	810
Capacity Available to Surge	N/A	9	N/A	-2,361
Capacity Required to Surge	N/A	2	N/A	634
Excess Capacity	N/A	9	N/A	-2,361
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	N/A	7	N/A	-2,995
NAVICP - Mechanicsburg				
Current Capacity	169	282	164	179,354
Utilized Capacity	67	108	49	47,285
Maximum Potential Capacity	169	282	164	179,354
Capacity Available to Surge	102	174	115	132,069
Capacity Required to Surge	14	22	10	9,457
Excess Capacity	102	174	115	132,069
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	88	152	105	122,612
NAVICP - Philadelphia				
Current Capacity	169	330	140	180,180
Utilized Capacity	70	113	52	49,453
Maximum Potential Capacity	169	330	140	180,180
Capacity Available to Surge	99	217	88	130,727
Capacity Required to Surge	14	23	10	9,890
Excess Capacity	99	217	88	130,727
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	85	194	78	120,837
Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM)				
Current Capacity	2	286	588	107,919
Utilized Capacity	9	15	7	6,437
Maximum Potential Capacity	2	286	588	107,919
Capacity Available to Surge	-7	271	581	101,482

Capacity Required to Surge	2	3	1	1,288
Excess Capacity	-7	271	581	101,482
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-9	268	580	100,194
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center				
Current Capacity	146	966	124	214,020
Utilized Capacity	117	188	86	82,393
Maximum Potential Capacity	146	966	124	214,020
Capacity Available to Surge	29	778	38	131,627
Capacity Required to Surge	24	38	17	16,478
Excess Capacity	29	778	38	131,627
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	5	740	21	115,149
TACOM - Rock Island				
Current Capacity	187	245	410	315,729
Utilized Capacity	247	397	182	173,661
Maximum Potential Capacity	187	245	410	315,729
Capacity Available to Surge	-60	-153	228	142,068
Capacity Required to Surge	50	79	36	34,733
Excess Capacity	-60	-153	228	142,068
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-110	-232	192	107,335
TACOM - Natick				
Current Capacity	0	66	3	81,259
Utilized Capacity	N/A	1	0	412
Maximum Potential Capacity	0	66	3	81,259
Capacity Available to Surge	N/A	65	3	80,847
Capacity Required to Surge	N/A	0	1	82
Excess Capacity	N/A	65	3	80,847
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	N/A	65	2	80,765
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center				
Current Capacity	196	817	78	105,088

Utilized Capacity	45	72	33	31,363
Maximum Potential Capacity	196	817	78	105,088
Capacity Available to Surge	151	745	45	73,725
Capacity Required to Surge	9	14	6	6,272
Excess Capacity	151	745	45	73,725
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	142	731	39	67,453
Storage and Distribution Capacities - Defense Distribution Depots				
Depots	Regular Covered Storage (cu ft)	Special Covered Storage (cu ft)	Open Storage (sq ft)	No. Loading Docks
Defense Distribution Depot Albany				
Current Capacity	12,994,000	1,882,000	52,000	60
Utilized Capacity	4,635,000	587,000	0	26
Maximum Potential Capacity	12,994,000	1,882,000	52,000	60
Capacity Available to Surge	8,359,000	1,295,000	52,000	34
Capacity Required to Surge	927,000	117,400	10,400	5
Excess Capacity	8,359,000	1,295,000	52,000	34
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	7,432,000	1,177,600	41,600	29
Defense Distribution Depot Anniston				
Current Capacity	13,550,000	2,123,000	2,550,000	28
Utilized Capacity	7,295,999	958,000	1,827,000	57
Maximum Potential Capacity	13,550,000	2,123,000	2,550,000	28
Capacity Available to Surge	6,254,001	1,165,000	723,000	-29
Capacity Required to Surge	1,459,200	191,600	365,400	11
Excess Capacity	6,254,001	1,165,000	723,000	-29
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	4,794,801	973,400	357,600	-40
Defense Distribution Depot Barstow				
Current Capacity	10,848,000	81,000	1,209,000	20
Utilized Capacity	3,551,000	32,000	186,999	15

Maximum Potential Capacity	10,848,000	81,000	1,209,000	20
Capacity Available to Surge	7,297,000	49,000	1,022,001	5
Capacity Required to Surge	710,200	6,400	37,400	3
Excess Capacity	7,297,000	49,000	1,022,001	5
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	6,586,800	42,600	984,601	2
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point				
Current Capacity	3,091,000	11,000	178,000	22
Utilized Capacity	2,022,001	7,999	105,000	10
Maximum Potential Capacity	3,091,000	11,000	178,000	22
Capacity Available to Surge	1,068,999	3,001	73,000	12
Capacity Required to Surge	404,400	1,600	20,999	2
Excess Capacity	1,068,999	3,001	73,000	12
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	664,599	1,401	52,001	10
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus				
Current Capacity	9,018,000	0	0	26
Utilized Capacity	3,236,000	0	0	14
Maximum Potential Capacity	9,018,000	0	0	26
Capacity Available to Surge	5,782,000	0	0	22
Capacity Required to Surge	647,200	0	0	1
Excess Capacity	5,782,000	0	0	22
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	5,134,800	0	0	21
Defense Distribution Depot Corpus Christi				
Current Capacity	1,191,000	977,000	123,000	16
Utilized Capacity	716,001	695,997	61,000	6
Maximum Potential Capacity	1,191,000	977,000	123,000	16
Capacity Available to Surge	474,999	281,003	62,000	10
Capacity Required to Surge	143,200	139,199	12,200	1

Excess Capacity	474,999	281,003	62,000	10
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	331,799	141,804	49,800	9
Defense Distribution Depot Hill				
Current Capacity	12,888,000	320,000	543,000	106
Utilized Capacity	9,164,998	208,332	508,000	53
Maximum Potential Capacity	12,888,000	320,000	543,000	106
Capacity Available to Surge	3,723,002	111,668	35,000	53
Capacity Required to Surge	1,833,000	41,666	101,600	11
Excess Capacity	3,723,002	111,668	35,000	53
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	1,890,002	70,002	-66,600	42
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville				
Current Capacity	4,284,000	215,000	97,000	16
Utilized Capacity	3,685,999	169,001	78,000	12
Maximum Potential Capacity	4,284,000	215,000	97,000	16
Capacity Available to Surge	598,001	45,999	19,000	4
Capacity Required to Surge	737,200	33,800	15,600	2
Excess Capacity	598,001	45,999	19,000	4
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-139,199	12,199	3,400	2
Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk				
Current Capacity	16,854,000	1,905,000	127,000	48
Utilized Capacity	8,897,001	339,001	9,000	12
Maximum Potential Capacity	16,854,000	1,905,000	127,000	48
Capacity Available to Surge	7,956,999	1,565,999	118,000	36
Capacity Required to Surge	1,779,400	67,800	1,800	2
Excess Capacity	7,956,999	1,565,999	118,000	36
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	6,177,599	1,498,199	116,200	34
Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City				
Current Capacity	16,641,000	330,000	544,000	64
Utilized Capacity	13,701,000	243,002	452,000	21

Maximum Potential Capacity	16,641,000	330,000	544,000	64
Capacity Available to Surge	2,940,000	86,998	92,000	43
Capacity Required to Surge	2,740,200	48,600	90,400	4
Excess Capacity	2,940,000	86,998	92,000	43
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	199,800	38,398	1,600	39
Defense Distribution Depot Pearl Harbor				
Current Capacity	3,376,000	291,000	89,000	58
Utilized Capacity	2,667,999	151,000	24,000	169
Maximum Potential Capacity	3,376,000	291,000	89,000	58
Capacity Available to Surge	708,001	140,000	65,000	-111
Capacity Required to Surge	533,600	30,200	15,600	34
Excess Capacity	708,001	140,000	65,000	-111
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	174,401	109,800	49,400	-145
Defense Distribution Depot Puget Sound				
Current Capacity	1,902,000	25,000	15,000	44
Utilized Capacity	771,999	19,999	5,001	20
Maximum Potential Capacity	1,902,000	25,000	15,000	44
Capacity Available to Surge	1,130,001	5,001	9,999	24
Capacity Required to Surge	154,400	4,000	1,000	4
Excess Capacity	1,130,001	5,001	9,999	24
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	975,601	1,001	8,999	20
Defense Distribution Depot Red River				
Current Capacity	17,514,000	6,641,000	1,868,000	34
Utilized Capacity	13,431,999	4,630,997	1,262,999	9
Maximum Potential Capacity	17,514,000	6,641,000	1,868,000	34
Capacity Available to Surge	4,082,001	2,010,003	605,001	25
Capacity Required to Surge	2,686,400	926,199	252,600	2

Excess Capacity	4,082,001	2,010,003	605,001	25
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	1,395,601	1,083,804	352,401	23
Defense Distribution Depot Richmond				
Current Capacity	24,005,000	3,016,000	862,000	18
Utilized Capacity	11,016,999	2,191,080	46,001	9
Maximum Potential Capacity	24,005,000	3,016,000	862,000	18
Capacity Available to Surge	12,988,001	825,000	815,999	9
Capacity Required to Surge	2,203,400	438,200	9,200	2
Excess Capacity	12,988,001	825,000	815,999	9
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	10,784,601	386,800	806,799	7
Defense Distribution Depot San Diego				
Current Capacity	9,062,000	614,000	110,000	100
Utilized Capacity	6,253,001	485,001	81,000	50
Maximum Potential Capacity	9,062,000	614,000	110,000	100
Capacity Available to Surge	2,808,999	128,999	29,000	50
Capacity Required to Surge	1,250,600	97,000	16,200	10
Excess Capacity	2,808,999	128,999	29,000	50
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	1,558,399	31,999	12,800	40
Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin				
Current Capacity	43,120,000	1,239,000	555,000	64
Utilized Capacity	31,853,000	772,001	248,000	13
Maximum Potential Capacity	43,120,000	1,239,000	555,000	64
Capacity Available to Surge	11,267,000	466,999	307,000	51
Capacity Required to Surge	6,370,600	154,400	49,600	3
Excess Capacity	11,267,000	466,999	307,000	51
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	4,896,400	312,599	257,400	48
Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna				
Current Capacity	53,154,000	2,064,000	259,000	244

Utilized Capacity	46,618,000	1,988,998	68,160	393
Maximum Potential Capacity	53,154,000	2,064,000	259,000	244
Capacity Available to Surge	6,536,000	75,002	190,840	-149
Capacity Required to Surge	9,323,600	397,800	17,040	79
Excess Capacity	6,536,000	75,002	190,840	-149
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-2,787,600	-322,798	173,800	-228
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna				
Current Capacity	15,158,000	238,000	901,000	22
Utilized Capacity	10,612,000	163,000	620,999	7
Maximum Potential Capacity	15,158,000	238,000	901,000	22
Capacity Available to Surge	4,546,000	75,000	280,001	15
Capacity Required to Surge	2,122,400	32,600	124,200	1
Excess Capacity	4,546,000	75,000	280,001	15
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	2,423,600	42,400	155,801	14
Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins				
Current Capacity	16,921,000	1,389,000	292,000	52
Utilized Capacity	13,647,000	1,106,000	295,999	45
Maximum Potential Capacity	16,921,000	1,389,000	292,000	52
Capacity Available to Surge	3,274,000	283,000	-3,999	7
Capacity Required to Surge	2,729,400	221,200	59,200	9
Excess Capacity	3,274,000	283,000	-3,999	7
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	544,600	61,800	-63,199	-2

c. Depot Level Repairable Procurement Management Consolidation

Recommendation: Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to Robins Air Force Base, GA and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Robins Air Force Base, GA.

Realign Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realign Detroit Arsenal, MI, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions, and by disestablishing the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realign Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to Detroit Arsenal, MI, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Detroit Arsenal, MI.

Realign Ft Huachuca, AZ, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and designate them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point

functions; relocate the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

Realign Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, PA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items, except those Navy items associated with Nuclear Propulsion Support, Level 1/Subsafe and Deep Submergence System Program (DSSP) Management, Strategic Weapon Systems Management, Design Unstable/Preproduction Test, Special Waivers, Major End Items and Fabricated or Reclaimed items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Marine Corps Base, Albany, GA, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for any residual Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocate the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, PA, Tinker Air Force Base, OK, Hill Air Force Base, UT, and Robins Air Force Base, GA, by relocating the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items, except those Navy items associated with Design Unstable/Preproduction Test, Special Waivers and Major End Items to Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, and reestablishing them as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions, and by disestablishing the procurement

management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables and designating them as Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, Inventory Control Point functions.

Realign Redstone Arsenal, AL, as follows: relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Aviation Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, and reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Aviation Depot Level Repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA, Aviation Inventory Control Point functions; relocate the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Missile Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH; reestablish them as Defense Logistics Agency Missile Inventory Control Point functions; disestablish the procurement management and related support functions for Missile Depot Level Repairables and designate them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Missile Inventory Control Point functions; and realign a portion of the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions necessary to oversee the Inventory Control Point activities at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Detroit Arsenal, MI, Soldier System Center, Natick, MA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL, to Headquarters Army Materiel Command (AMC).

Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, by relocating the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Realign Ft Belvoir, VA, by assigning the oversight of Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items and the oversight of procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Justification: The Supply & Storage Joint Cross Service Group looked at the responsibility for consumable and depot level repairable item management across the Department of Defense. This recommendation together with elements of a base closure recommendation supports the migration of the remaining Service Consumable Items to the oversight and management of a single DoD agency/activity. This proposal moves select Inventory Control Point functions (Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support) to DLA. A number of Inventory Control Point functions (Allowance/Initial Supply Support List Development,

Configuration Management, User Engineering Support, Provisioning, and User Technical Support) will be retained by the Services to maintain the appropriate critical mass to perform requirements and engineering. In addition, this recommendation realigns or relocates the procurement management and related support functions for the procurement of DLRs to DLA. For both consumable items and the procurement management of DLRs, this recommendation provides the opportunity to further consolidate Service and DLA Inventory Control Points by supply chain type. Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH (DSCC), manages the Maritime and Land supply chain, the Defense Supply Center Richmond, VA (DSCR), manages the Aviation supply chain, and Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, PA (DSCP), manages the Troop Support supply chain. The realignment should provide labor savings through transfer-in-place (application of standard labor rates across Inventory Control Points, headquarters staff reductions, and consolidation of support functions), reduce labor and support costs (from site consolidation), and business process improvements, such as, consolidation of procurement under a single inventory materiel manager, reduction of disposal costs, and improved stock positioning. Savings related to overhead/support functions, especially at those locations where physical realignments occur at a lead center can be anticipated. Finally, this recommendation supports transformation by transferring procurement management of all Service DLRs to a single DoD agency/activity.

This recommendation also allows for the relocation of the remaining Army ICP functions at Fort Huachuca (integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions) to be collocated with its respective Life Cycle Management Command.

This recommendation relocates Air Force ICP functions from Lackland AFB to Robins AFB to provide for the continuation of secure facilities required by the Lackland ICP.

In addition while this recommendation incorporates most of the actions required to complete the transfer of management to DLA, one element is captured in the closure recommendation associated Fort Monmouth, NJ, as noted below:

The realignment of Fort Monmouth, NJ, which relocates the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support Inventory Control Point functions for Consumable Items to Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, and reestablishes the m as Defense Logistics Agency Inventory Control Point functions; relocates the procurement management and related support functions for Depot Level Repairables to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and designates them as Defense Supply Center Columbus, OH, Inventory Control Point functions; and relocates the remaining integrated materiel management, user, and related support functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, has been incorporated into the closure of Fort Monmouth, NJ.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$127.036 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department of Defense during the implementation period is a savings of \$369.794 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$159.281 million with a payback expected

immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$1,889.577 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in the maximum potential job reductions (direct and indirect) over the 2006-2011 period, as follows:

Region of Influence	Direct Job Reductions	Indirect Job Reductions	Total Job Reductions	% of Economic Area Employment
Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ Metropolitan Statistical Area	212	159	371	0.72%
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham Metropolitan	18	12	30	Less than 0.1%
San Antonio, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area	293	302	595	Less than 0.1%
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL Metropolitan Statistical Area	740	647	1,387	0.61%
Albany, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area	7	6	13	Less than 0.1%
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area	10	9	19	Less than 0.1%
Huntsville, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area	71	55	126	Less than 0.1%
Ogden-Clearfield, UT Metropolitan Statistical Area	47	46	93	Less than 0.1%
Oklahoma City, OK Metropolitan Statistical Area	38	48	86	Less than 0.1%

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impacts: This recommendation will impact air quality at Aberdeen. Added operations will require New Source Review permitting and Air Conformity Analysis. Potential impacts to cultural resources may occur at Aberdeen as a result of increased times delays and negotiated restrictions, due to tribal government interest, and the fact that resources must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 18 Historic properties are identified at Detroit Arsenal to date but no restrictions to mission reported. Potential impacts may occur to historic resources at Detroit Arsenal, since resource must be valued on a case-by-case basis, thereby causing increased delays and costs. Additional operations may impact cultural resources and sensitive resource areas at Robins, which may impact operations. Noise contours at Robins may need to be reevaluated due to the change in mission. Additional operations at Aberdeen may further impact threatened/endangered species leading to additional restrictions on training or operations. Modification of on-installation treatment works may be necessary at Robins to accommodate the change in mission. Significant mitigation measures to limit releases may be required at Aberdeen and Detroit Arsenal to reduce impacts to water quality and achieve US EPA water quality standards. A wetlands survey may be needed at Detroit Arsenal. This recommendation has no impact on dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or wetlands. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$522K for environmental compliance activities. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Attachment

Supporting Information:

- **Potential or known competing recommendations.** No conflicting scenarios are noted.
- **Force Structure Capabilities.** DLA's ongoing implementation of its Business System Modernization (BSM) effort which replaces a 30 year old materiel management system and the ongoing development of a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system will further enhance DLA's ability to support its customers. BSM and CRM will allow DLA to be much more flexible and responsive in dealing with changing requirements. Nevertheless, throughout the surge in customer requirements, beginning during the build up for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, DLA's NICPs have been able to provide excellent support.

Reviews of the Service Force Structure Plans indicate that greater responsiveness, the ability to interact effectively in joint environments, and more flexible/agile supply chains are key elements of the plans. Operating in relatively stable end strength/funding level environment, especially after the war efforts are completed, is expected to be easier once BSM is fully implemented. In summary, DLA's full implementation of BSM and CRM should enable effective support in regards to the 20 year Force Structure Plan.

- **Military Value Analysis Results:** It was the military judgment of the S&S JCSG that for Consumable Items the Budget/Funding, Contracting, Cataloging, Requisition Processing, Customer Services, Item Management, Stock Control, Weapon System Secondary Item Support, Requirements Determination, and Integrated Materiel Management Technical Support service ICP functions should be consolidated under the authority of DLA. The S&S JCSG also decided that Procurement Management and related support functions for the procurement of DLRs would transfer to DLA. Since these functions will be disestablished at every Service ICP location, the relative military value scores of those locations were not determinative. It is the military judgment of the S&S JCSG that this recommendation provides the highest overall military value to the Department. For the relocation of Army ICP functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, from Ft. Huachuca, the Army determined that Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, had the highest military value of the relevant locations.

For the relocation of AF ICP functions from Lackland AFB, TX, to Robins AFB, GA, the AF determined that Robins had the higher military value.

- **S&S JCSG Military Value – Criteria and Characteristics:** The Supply and Storage (S&S) JCSG's approach divides the DOD supply and storage activities into three core functions: supply, storage, and distribution. Inventory Control Points were defined as activities that perform the Supply core function. For each of military value criteria, the S&S JCSG developed "characteristics" that bring a supply system context to the criteria by integrating the core functions (supply, storage, and distribution). The weighting of criteria constitutes the first-order weighting of military value and

provides the foundation for the attributes, metrics, and questions developed by the S&S JCSG. The criteria, weighting and supply characteristics are provided below.

- **Criterion 1 (35%):** The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
Characteristic. Use modern and flexible inventory management processes to support and enhance operational readiness, as defined by requirements determination, acquisition, and stock control.

- **Criterion 2 (20%):** The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
Characteristic. Operate from modern, efficient, and expandable infrastructure that enhances the inventory management process.

- **Criterion 3 (35%):** The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
Characteristic. A modern, flexible inventory management capability with sufficient capacity to adapt to future requirements as defined by personnel, information technology (IT), and infrastructure.

- **Criterion 4 (10%):** The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Characteristic. Manage inventory processes to minimize cost and manpower requirements.

S&S JCSG Military Value Scores and Ranking for all ICPs

Name of Activity	Military Score	Military Value Ranking
Hill AFB	0.2090	1 of 16
Fort Monmouth	0.2035	2 of 16
NAVICP Philadelphia	0.1994	3 of 16
Robins AFB	0.1956	4 of 16
DSC Columbus	0.1909	5 of 16
NAVICP Mechanicsburg	0.1884	6 of 16
Tinker AFB	0.1855	7 of 16
Redstone Arsenal	0.1793	8 of 16
DSC Richmond	0.1778	9 of 16
MCLB Albany	0.1770	10 of 16
Detroit Arsenal	0.1701	11 of 16
Rock Island	0.1666	12 of 16
DSC Philadelphia	0.1588	13 of 16
Lackland AFB	0.0853	14 of 16

Fort Huachuca	0.0722	15 of 16
Soldier System Center	0.0301	16 of 16

Army Overall Military Value Scores and Rankings for Army Installations

Name of Activity	Military Score	Military Ranking
Ft Bliss	6.20	1 of 88
Ft Lewis	5.71	2 of 88
Ft Hood	5.66	3 of 88
Ft Stewart	5.43	4 of 88
Ft Bragg	5.33	5 of 88
Yuma Proving Ground	5.28	6 of 88
Dugway Proving Ground	5.23	7 of 88
Ft Carson	5.22	8 of 88
Ft Benning	5.20	9 of 88
White Sands Missile Range	5.13	10 of 88
Ft Wainwright	5.06	11 of 88
Ft Knox	4.88	12 of 88
Ft Riley	4.86	13 of 88
Ft Campbell	4.80	14 of 88
Ft Drum	4.68	15 of 88
Ft Polk	4.64	16 of 88
Ft Irwin	4.53	17 of 88
Aberdeen Proving Ground	4.16	18 of 88
Name of Activity	Overall Military Score	Military Ranking
Ft Sill	4.00	19 of 88
Schofield Barracks	3.92	20 of 88
Ft Huachuca	3.82	21 of 88
Ft AP Hill	3.68	22 of 88
Ft Dix	3.45	23 of 88
Anniston Army Depot	3.19	24 of 88
Ft McCoy	3.18	25 of 88
Ft Jackson	3.12	26 of 88
McAlester Army Ammo Plant	3.10	27 of 88
Ft Rucker	3.06	28 of 88
Ft Richardson	2.98	29 of 88
Redstone Arsenal	2.97	30 of 88
Hawthorne Army Depot	2.94	31 of 88
Crane Army Depot	2.90	32 of 88
Ft Eustis	2.90	33 of 88
Ft Lee	2.79	34 of 88
Ft Leonard Wood	2.78	35 of 88
Ft Gordon	2.78	36 of 88
Tobyhanna Army Depot	2.77	37 of 88
Ft Belvoir	2.68	38 of 88

Letterkenny Army Depot	2.67	39 of 88
Red River Army Depot	2.61	40 of 88
Tooele Army Depot	2.48	41 of 88
Sierra Army Depot	2.48	42 of 88
Ft Sam Huston	2.40	43 of 88
Deseret Chem Plant	2.35	44 of 88
Bluegrass Army Depot	2.34	45 of 88
Walter Reed Army Med Ctr	2.34	46 of 88
Picatinny Arsenal	2.31	47 of 88
Watervliet Arsenal	2.26	48 of 88
Ft Meade	2.25	49 of 88
Ft Monmouth	2.25	50 of 88
Ft McPherson	2.23	51 of 88
Ft Gillen	2.21	52 of 88
Rock Island Arsenal	2.14	54 of 88
MOT Sunny Point	2.10	55 of 88
Pueblo Chem Depot	2.01	56 of 88
Ft Detrick	1.00	57 of 88
Soldier Support Center	1.94	58 of 88
Charles Kelley Supt	1.91	59 of 88
Milan Army Ammo Plant	1.90	60 of 88
Mississippi Army Ammo Plant	1.88	61 of 88
West Point	1.87	62 of 88
Pine Buff Arsenal	1.68	63 of 88
Ft Leavenworth	1.85	64 of 88
Ft Mc Nair	1.83	65 of 88
Newport Chem Depot	1.83	66 of 88
Ft Myer	1.82	67 of 88
Ft Monroe	1.80	68 of 88
Kansas Army Ammo Plant	1.79	69 of 88
Lake City Army Ammo Plant	1.77	70 of 88
Iowa Army Ammo Plant	1.76	71 of 88
Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant	1.72	72 of 88
Adelphi Labs	1.69	73 of 88
Ft Hamilton	1.68	74 of 88
Detroit Arsenal	1.64	75 of 88
Carlisle	1.63	76 of 88
Corpus Christi Army Depot Activity	1.60	77 of 88
Lima Tank Plant	1.59	78 of 88
Scranton Army Ammo Plant	1.53	79 of 88
USAG Selfridge	1.52	80 of 88
Radford Army Ammo Plant	1.50	81 of 88
Ft Shafter	1.48	82 of 88

Ft Buchanan	1.46	83 of 88
Holston Army Ammo Plant	1.43	84 of 88
Presidio of Monterey	1.34	85 of 88
Umatilla Chem Depot	1.30	86 of 88
Tripler Army Med Ctr	1.25	87 of 88
Riverbank Army Ammo Plant	1.18	88 of 88

Air Force Military Value Scores and Rankings for Air Force Logistics Activities

Name of Activity	Military Score	Military Value Ranking
Robins AFB-NICP	0.1067	1 of 79
Hill AFB-NICP	0.1066	2 of 79
Tinker AFB-NICP	0.1025	3 of 79
Eglin AFB-LRS-Active	0.0901	4 of 79
Little Rock AFB-LRS-Active	0.0851	5 of 79
Laughlin AFB-LRS-Active	0.0837	6 of 79
Wright-Patterson AFB-LRS-Active	0.0813	7 of 79
Holloman AFB-LRS-Active	0.0781	8 of 79
Sheppard AFB-LRS-Active	0.0764	9 of 79
Travis AFB-LRS-Active	0.0742	10 of 79
Tyndall AFB-LRS-Active	0.0704	11 of 79
Luke AFB-LRS-Active	0.0686	12 of 79
Shaw AFB-LRS-Active	0.0685	13 of 79
McCord AFB-LRS-Active	0.0675	14 of 79
Tinker AFB-LRS-Active	0.0643	15 of 79
Columbus AFB-LRS-Active	0.0643	16 of 79
Barksdale AFB-LRS-Active	0.0642	17 of 79
Ellsworth AFB-LRS-Active	0.0636	18 of 79
Malmstrom AFB-LRS-Active	0.0631	19 of 79
Charleston AFB-LRS-Active	0.0628	20 of 79
Dyess AFB-LRS-Active	0.0624	21 of 79
Elmendorf AFB-LRS-Active	0.0624	22 of 79
Langley AFB-LRS-Active	0.0619	23 of 79
Offutt AFB-LRS-Active	0.0593	24 of 79
Hill AFB-Depot Supply	0.0590	25 of 79

Name of Activity	Military Score	Military Value Ranking
Nellis AFB-LRS-Active	0.0587	26 of 79
Vance AFB-LRS-Active	0.0583	27 of 79
Fairchild AFB-LRS-Active	0.0581	28 of 79
Francis E. Warren AFB-LRS-Active	0.0578	29 of 79
Patrick AFB-LRS-Active	0.0566	30 of 79
Hurlburt Field-LRS-Active	0.0565	31 of 79
Seymour Johnson AFB-LRS-Active	0.0548	32 of 79
Tinker AFB-Depot Supply	0.0547	33 of 79
Kirtland AFB-LRS-Active	0.0544	34 of 79
Robins AFB-Depot Supply	0.0542	35 of 79
Altus AFB-LRS-Active	0.0537	36 of 79
Robins AFB-LRS-Active	0.0534	37 of 79
Dover AFB-LRS-Active	0.0533	38 of 79
Edwards AFB-LRS-Active	0.0526	39 of 79
Mountain Home AFB-LRS-Active	0.0523	40 of 79
McConnell AFB-LRS-Active	0.0521	41 of 79
Vandenberg AFB-LRS-Active	0.0508	42 of 79
Peterson AFB-LRS-Active	0.0507	43 of 79
Whiteman AFB-LRS-Active	0.0507	44 of 79
Hill AFB-LRS-Active	0.0498	45 of 79
Eielson AFB-LRS-Active	0.0485	46 of 79
Cannon AFB-LRS-Active	0.0484	47 of 79
Randolph AFB-LRS-Active	0.0482	48 of 79
Beale AFB-LRS-Active	0.0460	49 of 79
Davis-Monthan AFB-Depot Supply	0.0452	50 of 79
Keesler AFB-LRS-Active	0.0445	51 of 79
Andrews AFB-LRS-Active	0.0433	52 of 79
Scott AFB-LRS-Active	0.0429	53 of 79
Andersen AFB-LRS-Active	0.0417	54 of 79
Minot AFB-LRS-Active	0.0414	55 of 79
Pope AFB-LRS-Active	0.0408	56 of 79

Name of Activity	Military Score	Military Value Ranking
Maxwell AFB-LRS-Active	0.0407	57 of 79
Lackland AFB-LRS-Active	0.0405	58 of 79
Grand Forks AFB-LRS-Active	0.0390	59 of 79
Scott AFB-RSS	0.0373	60 of 79
Moody AFB-LRS-Active	0.0368	61 of 79
Lackland AFB-NICP	0.0368	62 of 79
Hickam AFB-LRS-Active	0.0344	63 of 79
Goodfellow AFB-LRS-Active	0.0317	64 of 79
McGuire AFB-LRS-Active	0.0285	65 of 79
Bolling AFB	0.0217	66 of 79
MacDill AFB-LRS-Active	0.0200	67 of 79
Hanscom AFB-LRS-Active	0.0176	68 of 79
Los Angeles AFB-LRS-Active	0.0164	69 of 79
Hickam AFB-RSS	0.0148	70 of 79
Langley AFB-RSS	0.0123	71 of 79
Davis-Monthan AFB-LRS-Active	0.0103	72 of 79
Hurlburt Field-RSS	0.0011	73 of 79
Nashville IAP AGS-LRS-Active	0.0000	74 of 79
Robins AFB-RSS	0.0000	75 of 79
McGuire AFB-N/A	0.0000	76 of 79
Onizuka AFS	0.0000	77 of 79
Indian Springs AFS-LRS-Active	0.0000	78 of 79
Arnold AFS-LRS-Active	0.0000	79 of 79

- S&S JCSG Capacity Analysis Results.** Individual activity infrastructure was analyzed by examining the productivity of key resource inputs, e.g., labor (man-hours) and actual space (office, warehouse, etc.). A low rate of productivity for key resource inputs was assumed to indicate either inefficient use of resources and/or excess resource capacities. The capacity methodology utilized a standard product and standard resource productivity rates to determine excess capacity in the Supply function. The S&S JCSG concluded that sufficient excess Supply capacity existed to warrant development of BRAC scenarios derived from optimization modeling maximized military value while minimizing the number of open activities. Capacity analysis results are provided below.

Location	Purchasing / budgeting labor (FTE)	Supply labor (FTE)	Technical labor (FTE)	Work space (SF)
CO MCLB ALBANY GA				
Current Capacity	7	231	184	626,043
Current Usage	45	72	33	31,578
Max Potential Capacity	7	231	184	626,043
Capacity Available to Surge	-38	159	151	594,465
Capacity Required to Surge	9	15	7	6,316
Excess Capacity	-38	159	151	594,465
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-47	144	144	588,149
DEFENSE SUPPLY CENTER COLUMBUS				
Current Capacity	723	528	637	307,230
Current Usage	531	854	391	373,318
Max Potential Capacity	723	528	637	307,230
Capacity Available to Surge	192	-326	246	-66,088
Capacity Required to Surge	107	171	78	74,663
Excess Capacity	192	-326	246	-66,088
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	86	-497	168	-140,751
DEFENSE SUPPLY CENTER PHILADELPHIA				
Current Capacity	1,044	891	365	253,699
Current Usage	1,143	1,837	841	803,037
Max Potential Capacity	1,044	891	365	253,699
Capacity Available to Surge	-99	-947	-475	-549,338
Capacity Required to Surge	228	367	168	160,607
Excess Capacity	-99	-947	-475	-549,338
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-327	-1,314	-643	-709,945
DEFENSE SUPPLY CENTER RICHMOND				
Current Capacity	758	989	188	437,318
Current Usage	424	681	312	297,679
Max Potential Capacity	758	989	188	437,318
Capacity Available to Surge	334	308	-124	139,639
Capacity Required to Surge	84	136	62	59,535
Excess Capacity	334	308	-124	139,639

Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	250	172	-186	80,104
DETROIT ARSENAL (ILSC)				
Current Capacity	115	363	766	155,216
Current Usage	11	18	8	7,691
Max Potential Capacity	115	363	766	155,216
Capacity Available to Surge	104	345	758	147,525
Capacity Required to Surge	2	3	2	1,538
Excess Capacity	104	345	758	147,525
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	102	342	756	145,987
FT HUACHUCA (CSLA)				
Current Capacity	3	85	27	37,500
Current Usage	9	14	7	6,296
Max Potential Capacity	3	85	27	37,500
Capacity Available to Surge	-6	71	20	31,204
Capacity Required to Surge	2	3	1	1,260
Excess Capacity	-6	71	20	31,204
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-8	68	19	29,944
FT MONMOUTH (CECOM-ICP)				
Current Capacity	90	325	474	520,547
Current Usage	12	20	9	8,783
Max Potential Capacity	90	325	474	520,547
Capacity Available to Surge	78	305	465	511,764
Capacity Required to Surge	3	4	2	1,757
Excess Capacity	78	305	465	511,764
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	75	301	463	510,007
Hill AFB-NICP				
Current Capacity	252	414	220	162,648
Current Usage	24	38	18	16,726
Max Potential Capacity	252	414	220	162,648
Capacity Available to Surge	228	376	202	145,922
Capacity Required to Surge	5	8	3	3,345
Excess Capacity	228	376	202	145,922
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	223	368	199	142,577
Lackland AFB-NICP				
Current Capacity	N/A	16	N/A	810
Current Usage	N/A	7	N/A	3,171

Max Potential Capacity	N/A	16	N/A	810
Capacity Available to Surge	N/A	9	N/A	-2,361
Capacity Required to Surge	N/A	2	N/A	634
Excess Capacity	N/A	9	N/A	-2,361
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	N/A	7	N/A	-2,995
NAVICP_MECH				
Current Capacity	169	282	164	179,354
Current Usage	67	108	49	47,285
Max Potential Capacity	169	282	164	179,354
Capacity Available to Surge	102	174	115	132,069
Capacity Required to Surge	14	22	10	9,457
Excess Capacity	102	174	115	132,069
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	88	152	105	122,612
NAVICP_PHIL				
Current Capacity	169	330	140	180,180
Current Usage	70	113	52	49,453
Max Potential Capacity	169	330	140	180,180
Capacity Available to Surge	99	217	88	130,727
Capacity R required to Surge	14	23	10	9,890
Excess Capacity	99	217	88	130,727
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	85	194	78	120,837
REDSTONE ARSENAL (AMCOM-ICP)				
Current Capacity	2	286	588	107,919
Current Usage	9	15	7	6,437
Max Potential Capacity	2	286	588	107,919
Capacity Available to Surge	-7	271	581	101,482
Capacity Required to Surge	2	3	1	1,288
Excess Capacity	-7	271	581	101,482
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-9	268	580	100,194
Robins AFB-NICP				
Current Capacity	146	966	124	214,020
Current Usage	117	188	86	82,393
Max Potential Capacity	146	966	124	214,020
Capacity Available to Surge	29	778	38	131,627
Capacity Required to Surge	24	38	17	16,478
Excess Capacity	29	778	38	131,627

Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	5	740	21	115,149
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL (TACOM-ICP)				
Current Capacity	187	245	410	315,729
Current Usage	247	397	182	173,661
Max Potential Capacity	187	245	410	315,729
Capacity Available to Surge	-60	-153	228	142,068
Capacity Required to Surge	50	79	36	34,733
Excess Capacity	-60	-153	228	142,068
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	-110	-232	192	107,335
SOLDIER SYSTEM COMMAND (TACOM-ICP)				
Current Capacity	N/A	66	3	81,259
Current Usage	N/A	1	0*	412
Max Potential Capacity	N/A	66	3	81,259
Capacity Available to Surge	N/A	65	3	80,847
Capacity Required to Surge	N/A	0	1	82
Excess Capacity	N/A	65	3	80,847
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	N/A	65	2	80,765
Tinker AFB-NICP				
Current Capacity	196	817	78	105,088
Current Usage	45	72	33	31,363
Max Potential Capacity	196	817	78	105,088
Capacity Available to Surge	151	745	45	73,725
Capacity Required to Surge	9	14	6	6,272
Excess Capacity	151	745	45	73,725
Excess Capacity at 20% Surge	142	731	39	67,453

N/A – no resources reported for that function

* - In this case the amount of work required of SOLDIER SYSTEM COMMAND (TACOM-ICP) by the capacity model (see S&S JCSG Capacity Report dated November, 29 2004 for a full discussion of the capacity model) was equivalent to 0.43 FTEs, rounded down to 0.

ARMY Overall Capacity Information by Installation

Name of Activity	General Admin Bldg (K SF)
Ft Bliss	
Current Capacity	1,179
Current Usage	722
Max Potential Capacity	1,179

Ft Lewis	
Current Capacity	998
Current Usage	703
Max Potential Capacity	998
Ft Hood	
Current Capacity	977
Current Usage	923
Max Potential Capacity	977
Yuma Proving Ground	
Current Capacity	123
Current Usage	66
Max Potential Capacity	123
Dugway Proving Ground	
Current Capacity	140
Current Usage	150
Max Potential Capacity	140
Ft Carson	
Current Capacity	756
Current Usage	416
Max Potential Capacity	756
Ft Benning	
Current Capacity	529
Current Usage	641
Max Potential Capacity	529
White Sands Missile	
Current Capacity	938
Current Usage	924
Max Potential Capacity	938
Aberdeen Proving Ground	
Current Capacity	2,456
Current Usage	1,855
Max Potential Capacity	2,456
Ft Wainwright	
Current Capacity	202
Current Usage	185
Max Potential Capacity	202
Fort Knox	
Current Capacity	1,210
Current Usage	445
Max Potential Capacity	1,210
Ft Riley	
Current Capacity	579
Current Usage	545
Max Potential Capacity	579
Ft Campbell	

Current Capacity	704
Current Usage	420
Max Potential Capacity	704
Ft Drum	
Current Capacity	433
Current Usage	325
Max Potential Capacity	433
Ft Polk	
Current Capacity	717
Current Usage	561
Max Potential Capacity	717
Ft Irwin	
Current Capacity	348
Current Usage	229
Max Potential Capacity	348
Ft Sill	
Current Capacity	1,106
Current Usage	792
Max Potential Capacity	1,106
Schofield Barracks	
Current Capacity	380
Current Usage	676
Max Potential Capacity	380
Ft Huachuca	
Current Capacity	404
Current Usage	175
Max Potential Capacity	404
Ft AP Hill	
Current Capacity	82
Current Usage	22
Max Potential Capacity	82
Ft Dix	
Current Capacity	276
Current Usage	244
Max Potential Capacity	276
Anniston Army Depot	
Current Capacity	303
Current Usage	315
Max Potential Capacity	303
Ft McCoy	
Current Capacity	355
Current Usage	114
Max Potential Capacity	355
Ft Jackson	
Current Capacity	355

Current Usage	215
Max Potential Capacity	355
McAlester Army Ammo Plant	
Current Capacity	134
Current Usage	106
Max Potential Capacity	134
Ft Rucker	
Current Capacity	613
Current Usage	201
Max Potential Capacity	613
Ft Richardson	
Current Capacity	389
Current Usage	332
Max Potential Capacity	389
Redstone Arsenal	
Current Capacity	2611
Current Usage	2743
Max Potential Capacity	2611
Hawthorne Army Depot	
Current Capacity	117
Current Usage	6
Max Potential Capacity	117
Crane Army Depot	
Current Capacity	61
Current Usage	33
Max Potential Capacity	61
Ft Eustis	
Current Capacity	682
Current Usage	524
Max Potential Capacity	682
Ft Lee	
Current Capacity	619
Current Usage	484
Max Potential Capacity	619
Ft Leonard Wood	
Current Capacity	466
Current Usage	479
Max Potential Capacity	466
Ft Gordon	
Current Capacity	521
Current Usage	462
Max Potential Capacity	521
Tobyhanna Army Depot	
Current Capacity	317
Current Usage	318

Max Potential Capacity	317
Ft Belvoir	
Current Capacity	1,885
Current Usage	1,800
Max Potential Capacity	1,885
Letterkenny Army Depot	
Current Capacity	268
Current Usage	281
Max Potential Capacity	268
Red River Army Depot	
Current Capacity	143
Current Usage	180
Max Potential Capacity	143
Toole Army Depot	
Current Capacity	82
Current Usage	129
Max Potential Capacity	82
Sierra Army Depot	
Current Capacity	127
Current Usage	32
Max Potential Capacity	127
Ft Sam Houston	
Current Capacity	1,710
Current Usage	926
Max Potential Capacity	1,710
Deseret Chem Plant	
Current Capacity	341
Current Usage	13
Max Potential Capacity	341
Bluegrass Army Depot	
Current Capacity	83
Current Usage	99
Max Potential Capacity	83
Walter Reed Army Med Center	
Current Capacity	466
Current Usage	366
Max Potential Capacity	466
Picatinny Arsenal	
Current Capacity	867
Current Usage	639
Max Potential Capacity	867
Watervliet Arsenal	
Current Capacity	101
Current Usage	99
Max Potential Capacity	101

Ft Meade	
Current Capacity	954
Current Usage	980
Max Potential Capacity	954
Ft Monmouth	
Current Capacity	240
Current Usage	0
Max Potential Capacity	240
Ft McPherson	
Current Capacity	1064
Current Usage	1055
Max Potential Capacity	1064
Ft Gillen	
Current Capacity	423
Current Usage	423
Max Potential Capacity	423
Rock Island Arsenal	
Current Capacity	1,573
Current Usage	1,026
Max Potential Capacity	1,573
MOT Sunny Point	
Current Capacity	41
Current Usage	41
Max Potential Capacity	41
Pueblo Chem Depot	
Current Capacity	242
Current Usage	13
Max Potential Capacity	242
Ft Detrick	
Current Capacity	353
Current Usage	439
Max Potential Capacity	353
Soldier Support Center	
Current Capacity	241
Current Usage	267
Max Potential Capacity	241
Charles Kelley Supt	
Current Capacity	45
Current Usage	10
Max Potential Capacity	45
Milan Army Ammo Plant	
Current Capacity	63
Current Usage	2
Max Potential Capacity	63
Mississippi Army Ammo	

Current Capacity	211
Current Usage	0
Max Potential Capacity	211
West Point	
Current Capacity	905
Current Usage	157
Max Potential Capacity	905
Pine Buff Arsenal	
Current Capacity	246
Current Usage	92
Max Potential Capacity	246
Ft Leavenworth	
Current Capacity	548
Current Usage	580
Max Potential Capacity	548
Ft Mc Nair	
Current Capacity	218
Current Usage	167
Max Potential Capacity	218
Newport Chem Depot	
Current Capacity	43
Current Usage	6
Max Potential Capacity	43
Ft Myer	
Current Capacity	183
Current Usage	54
Max Potential Capacity	183
Ft Monroe	
Current Capacity	560
Current Usage	295
Max Potential Capacity	560
Kansas Army Depot	
Current Capacity	86
Current Usage	1
Max Potential Capacity	1
Lake City Army Depot	
Current Capacity	173
Current Usage	2
Max Potential Capacity	173
Iowa Army Ammo Depot	
Current Capacity	99
Current Usage	3
Max Potential Capacity	99
Lone Star Army Ammo Plant	
Current Capacity	115

Current Usage	1
Max Potential Capacity	115
Adelphi Labs	
Current Capacity	248
Current Usage	248
Max Potential Capacity	248
Ft Hamilton	
Current Capacity	177
Current Usage	152
Max Potential Capacity	177
Detroit Arsenal	
Current Capacity	619
Current Usage	628
Max Potential Capacity	619
Carlisle	
Current Capacity	135
Current Usage	183
Max Potential Capacity	135
Corpus Christi Army Depot Activity	
Current Capacity	238
Current Usage	217
Max Potential Capacity	238
Lima Tank Plant	
Current Capacity	115
Current Usage	6
Max Potential Capacity	115
Scranton Army Ammo Plant	
Current Capacity	33
Current Usage	1
Max Potential Capacity	32
USAG Selfridge	
Current Capacity	61
Current Usage	48
Max Potential Capacity	61
Radford Army Ammo Plant	
Current Capacity	193
Current Usage	14
Max Potential Capacity	193
Ft Shafter	
Current Capacity	484
Current Usage	577
Max Potential Capacity	484
Ft Buchanan	
Current Capacity	244
Current Usage	308

Max Potential Capacity	244
Holston Army Ammo Plant	
Current Capacity	151
Current Usage	3
Max Potential Capacity	151
Presidio of Monterey	
Current Capacity	180
Current Usage	67
Max Potential Capacity	180
Umatilla Chem Depot	
Current Capacity	51
Current Usage	31
Max Potential Capacity	51
Hunter Army Airfield	
Current Capacity	63
Current Usage	70
Max Potential Capacity	63
Louisiana AAP	
Current Capacity	113
Current Usage	0
Max Potential Capacity	113
Ft Stewart	
Current Capacity	460
Current Usage	410
Max Potential Capacity	460
Ft Story	
Current Capacity	71
Current Usage	21
Max Potential Capacity	71
Ft Bragg	
Current Capacity	1,806
Current Usage	2,569
Max Potential Capacity	1,806

V. Appendices

a. Final Capacity Report

See attached

b. Final Military Value Report

See attached

c. Acronyms

AAO	Approved Acquisition Objective
AC	Active Component
ADP	Automated Data Process
AFB	Air Force Base
ALC	Air Logistics Center
AMCOM	Aviation and Missile Command
ASAP	As Soon as Possible
BGen	Brigadier General
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
BSM	Business System Modernization
C2	Command and Control
CCP	Consolidation and Coordination Point
CECOM	Communications and Electronics Command
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIT	Consumable Item Transfer
CNA	Center of Naval Analysis
COBRA	Cost of Base Realignment Analysis
CoC	Council of Colonels
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONUS	Continental United States
CPSG	Cryptological Product Support Group
CR	Candidate Recommendation
CRM	Customer Relationship Management
CWT	Customer Wait Time
DAS	Deputy Assistant Secretaries
DD	Distribution Depot
DDD	Defense Distribution Depot
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLIS	Defense Logistics Information Service
DLR	Depot Level Repairable
DMRD	Defense Management Review Decision
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDAAC	Department of Defense Activity Access Code
DONBITS	Department of the Navy BRAC Information Transfer System
DRMO	Defense Reutilization Management Office
DSC	Defense Supply Center
DTCI	Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
FDP	Forward Distribution Point
FSMP	Full Service Management Program
FSP	Force Structure Plan
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
GAO	General Accounting Office
GPW	General Purpose Warehouse

GSA	General Services Administration
HHG	Household Goods
HQ	Headquarters
IAW	In Accordance With
ICP	Inventory Control Point
ICP	Internal Control Plan
IEC	Infrastructure Executive Council
IG	Inspector General
IMM	Integrated Materiel Management
IND	Industrial
ISG	Infrastructure Steering Group
IVT	Installations Visualization Tool
JCSG	Joint Cross-Service Group
LMI	LMI, Inc.
MCB	Marine Corps Base
MCLB	Marine Corps Logistics Base
MID	Management Initiative Decision
MilCon	Military Construction
MilDep	Military Department
MilSpec	Military Specification
MilVal	Military Value
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NAS	Naval Air Station
NAVICP	Navy Inventory Control Point
NCR	National Capital Region
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
NLT	No Later Than
NPV	Net Present Value
NSTR	Nothing Significant to Report
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
ODIN	Operational Digital Network
ODS	Ozone Depleting Substance
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OGE	Out of Ground Effect
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
PBA	Performance Base Agreement
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PBL	Performance Based Logistics
PEI	Principal End Item
PICA	Primary Inventory Control Activity
PM	Program Manager
POAM	Plan of Actions and Milestone
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
POM	Program Objective Memorandum

POTUS	President of the United States
RADM	Rear Admiral
RC	Reserve Component
RFC	Request for Clarification
RIMM	Regional Inventory Materiel Management
ROE	Rules of Engagement
S&S	Supply and Storage
S&S JCSG	Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group
SDC	Scenario Data Call
SDP	Strategic Distribution Platform
SES	Senior Executive Service
SF	Standard Form
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSEI	Summary of Scenario Environmental Impact
STT	Scenario Tracking Tool
TACOM	Tactical Command
TBD	To Be Determined
TMDE	Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
TO	Transformational Option
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USC	United States Code
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
VADM	Vice Admiral
WIDGET	Web-Base Installation Data Gathering and Entry Tool
WMS	Warehouse Management System

d. Glossary

Above Installation Activities - Those supply and storage Activities that procure, hold and manage materiel not specific to individual operating units. These Activities typically manage inventory, held for sale, redistribution or production and are generally considered “wholesale” in nature. National level Inventory Control Points (ICPs) are included in this category (also see “Supply and Storage Activities”).

Average Number of Receipts Processed Per Person - The average number of receipts processed per person is defined as the number of receipts processed over the time period given divided by the number of personnel working in the receiving section over that same time period.

Active Inventory - Materiel which is expected to be consumed within the budget year (2 years) and materiel that has been purchased to meet specific war reserve requirements.

Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) - The quantity of an item authorized for peacetime and wartime requirements to equip and sustain U.S. and Allied Forces, in accordance with current DoD policies and plans. This quantity shall be sufficient to support other U.S. Government Agencies, as appropriate.

Base Closure Law - The provisions of Title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Pub. L. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, 10 U.S.C. S 2687 note), or the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 100-526, Part A of Title XXIX of 104 Stat. 1808, 10 U.S.C. S 2687 note).

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) - It is the process DoD has previously used to reorganize its installation infrastructure to more efficiently and effectively support its forces, increase operational readiness and facilitate new ways of doing business. DoD anticipates that BRAC 2005 will build upon processes used in previous BRAC efforts.

Capital Expenditure - Capital expenditure is defined as expenditures, in excess of \$250,000 (excluding O&M funds), for IT equipment, technology, software and infrastructure.

Closure - All missions of the installation have ceased or have been relocated. All personnel positions (military, civilian and contractor) have either been eliminated or relocated, except for personnel required for caretaking, conducting any ongoing environmental cleanup, and disposal of the base, or personnel remaining in authorized enclaves.

Commodity Type(s) - Listed are the 16 commodity types to be used in the “C-Factor:”

1. Armaments: Self Propelled and Towed Artillery Systems, Howitzers, Cannons, Deck and Aerial Gun Systems, Mortars and Launchers, Individual and crew-served Weapons, Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

2. Aviation: Fixed Wing Aircraft, Rotary Wing Aircraft, Aircraft Ground Support Equipment, Airframe Structural Components, Propellers and Rotor Blades, Aircraft Engines, Drive Mechanisms and Components, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Air Traffic Control Systems,

Launching Equipment, Hydraulic, Electrical, Cooling and Pressurizing System Equipment, Aviation Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

3. Chemical & Biological: Chemical and Biological Defense Equipment, Alarms, Monitors and Detectors, Protective Masks, Filters and Components, Decontamination Equipment, Protective Shelters, Smoke Generation Equipment, Chemical Agent Stocks

4. Combat Vehicles: Tracked and Wheeled Combat Vehicles, Armored Personnel carriers, Tanks, Combat Engineer Vehicles, Light and Heavy Armored Recovery Vehicles, Combat vehicle Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

5. Communications Electronics: Fire Control Systems, Avionics, Radar Systems, Computer Systems, Telecommunications Systems, Tactical and Strategic Communications, Radio, Telephone and Telegraph Equipment, Movie and Television Equipment, Electronic Navigation Systems, Night Vision Equipment, Antennas and Waveguides, Electrical Assemblies, Boards and Cards, Fiber Optic Systems and Components, Batteries, Electrical Motors, Lighting Equipment, COMSEC Equipment, Communications-Electronics Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

6. Construction Equipment: Front End Loaders, Graders, Dozers, Cranes, Scrapers, Backhoes, Rollers, Engines and components, Attachments and Ancillary Equipment, Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

7. Conventional Ordnance: Large and Small Caliber Ammunition, Explosives, Pyrotechnics, Warheads, Mines, Grenades, Projectiles, Bombs

8. Fuels/POL: Bulk and Packaged Class III Items, Diesel, MOGAS, F76, JP8, JP5, Lube Oils, Fuel Oils, Compressed Natural Gas, Greases, Hydraulic Fluids, Brake Fluids

9. Ground Vehicles: Tactical and Non-Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, Trucks of all sizes and types...fuel, cargo, flatbed, dump, etc., Trailers, Motorcycles, Engines, Transmissions and rear ends, Other Assemblies and Repair Parts

10. Medical: Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Medical Equipment (Laboratory and Surgical), Medical Supplies, Dental Equipment and Supplies, Veterinary Equipment and Supplies, Field Medical Equipment

11. Nuclear Subsafe: Nuclear Propulsion Systems, Nuclear Propulsion System Components

12. Ships, Vessels and Watercraft: Surface Ships and Vessels of All Classes (Combatant and Non-Combatant), Submarines and Underwater Ships and Vessels, Harbor Craft, Landing Craft, Tugs and Barges, Air Cushion Vehicles, Ship and Boat Propulsion Systems, Marine Hardware and Hull Items, Miscellaneous Ship Marine Equipment, Diving Equipment, Ship, Vessel and Watercraft Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

13. Space & Missiles: Rockets, Guided and Unguided Missiles, Missile Remote Control Systems, Launchers, Motors and Guidance Systems, Gantries and Launch Platforms, Space Vehicles, Test and Diagnostic Equipment, Rocket and Missile Major Assemblies and Repair Parts

14. Subsistence: Meals Ready-To-Eat, Tray Packs, Food and Water

15. Troop Support Equipment: Individual Clothing and Equipment, Organizational Clothing and Equipment, Textiles, Tentage, Power Generation Equipment, Heating Equipment

16. Other: Any Other Categories of Equipment Not Listed Above.

Commission - The Commission established by section 2902 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended.

Community Preference - Section 2914(b)(2) of BRAC requires the Secretary of Defense to consider any notice received from a local government in the vicinity of a military installation that the government would approve of the closure or realignment of the installation.

Consumable Items - Items which are expendable. They are either not repairable or are not economically repairable. These items will be classified as Class I, II, III, IV, VIII and IX.

Contingency Retention Stock - That portion of the quantity of an item greater than the AAO and economic retention stock for which there is no predictable demand or quantifiable requirement, and that normally would be allocated as Potential Reutilization/Disposal Stock except for a determination that the quantity will be retained for specific contingencies.

Contracting Functions - Contracting functions are defined to include description (but not determination; hence not item management) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and awarding of contracts, and all phases of contract administration.

Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) - Is an analytical tool used to calculate the costs, savings, and return on investment, of proposed realignment and closure actions.

Current Capacity - Total resources currently available to meet an activity's requirements. For their functions computed as:

- Supply. Sum of available resources (labor and workspace).
- Storage. Sum of available cubic footage available for each covered storage category, square footage for open storage, and barrels of POL for wet tank storage.
- Distribution: Sum of available loading bays at strategic distribution depots.

Current Usage - Minimum number of resources required to meet an activity's requirements. For each function computed as:

- Supply. Minimum number of resources (labor and workspace) needed to produce the required number of standard products in each supply labor category. (Utilization of standard product and resource productivity rates)
- Storage: Sum of utilized cubic footage for each covered storage category, square footage utilized for open storage and barrels of POL for wet tank storage.
- Distribution. Utilized loading bays at strategic distribution depots.

Data Certification - Section 2903 (c)(5) of BRAC requires specified DoD personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information provided to the secretary of Defense or the 2005 Commission concerning the realignment or closure of a military installation is accurate and complete.

Demand - Demand is defined as a valid requirement for material placed on the supply system by an authorized customer. Demand is categorized as recurring or nonrecurring and is measured in terms of frequency and quantity. Demands are defined as line items, not quantity ordered.

For example:

How to compute Number of Demands Received:

NSN 1234-01-567-8900
One customer order for 10 each
Second customer order for 1 each
Third customer order for 3 each

NSN 1111-01-222-3456
One customer order for 3 each
Second customer order for 4 each
If this were the entire universe of stock numbers managed by the Supply and Storage Activity, the Number of Demands Received equals 5.

Depot Level Repairable - See Repairables.

Distribution Nodes - Distribution nodes may be: air, rail, ground, water or pipeline. An air distribution node is defined as an airfield capable of handling, at a minimum, one of these types of aircraft: C-17, C-5, C-141 or equivalent. The water node is defined as a port providing access to major waterways and having containerized cargo capability. A rail node is defined as a railhead capable of on-loading and off-loading multiple rail cars simultaneously. The pipeline node refers to pipelines used for distribution of bulk POL. A ground node is simply an area designed to load and unload tractor trailer trucks.

Economic Retention Stock - That portion of the quantity of an item greater than the AAO determined to be more economical to retain for future peacetime issues than to dispose and satisfy projected future requirements through new procurement and/or repair. To warrant economic retention, items must have a reasonably predictable demand rate.

End Items - Items of such importance to the operating readiness of operating units that they are subject to continuing centralized, individual item management and asset control throughout all command and support echelons. End items are generally high unit costs which receive premium and comprehensive supply management attention, both in the supply system and in all command echelons within the Military Service. These items would be coded at Class VII major end items.

Excess - Materiel that has completed reutilization screening within the DoD and is not required for the needs and the discharge of responsibilities on any DoD activity.

Excess Capacity - Difference between current capacity and current usage plus surge.

Force Structure - Numbers, size and composition of the units that comprise US defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings, aircraft, tanks, etc.

Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) - Full-time equivalents are used as the basis to define personnel at the installation and it is based on 2080 manhours of work. That is, a person at the installation may be greater than one FTE if a large amount of overtime was performed in the year or less than one FTE if the person worked part-time. FTEs include direct and indirect labor.

Individual Retrieval - An individual retrieval is a single removal of supplies from a storage location. An individual retrieval could involve removal of a single item, 1 box containing a dozen items, or 1 package containing 2 items.

Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) - One of two senior groups established by the Secretary of Defense to oversee and operate the BRAC 2005 process. The Infrastructure Executive Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and composed of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Chiefs of Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), is the policy making and oversight body for the entire BRAC 2005 process.

Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) - The subordinate of two senior groups established by the Secretary of Defense to oversee and operate the BRAC 2005 process. The Infrastructure Steering Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), and composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for installations and environment, the Service Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) (DUSD(I&E)), will oversee Joint Cross-Service analyses of common business-oriented functions and ensure the integration of that process with the Military Department and Defense Agency specific analyses of all other functions.

Intransit Assets - Materiel that is between storage locations, either wholesale or retail or materiel shipped from vendors after acceptance by the government but not included in the records wholesale inventory used in the stratification process.

Inactive Inventory - Materiel that is not expected to be consumed within the budget period but is likely to be utilized in future years.

Installation and Below Activities - Those supply and storage Activities that support organizational level needs for supplies and materiel. Customer organizations of these Activities are typically specific ships, squadrons, wings, battalions and repair shops. These Activities are generally considered “retail” activities (also see “Supply and Storage Activities”).

Inventory Accuracy - Inventory accuracy is defined as the total number of individual warehouse storage locations inventoried having the correct on-hand balance, expressed as a percentage.

Inventory Control - Inventory control (DoD, NATO) is defined as that phase of military logistics which includes managing, cataloging, requirements determinations, procurement, distribution, overhaul, and disposal of materiel. Also called inventory management; materiel control; materiel management; supply management.

Inventory Management - Inventory management is defined to include the management, cataloging, requirements determination, procurement, and determination of overhaul, stock distribution and disposal requirements.

Inventory Turnover Rate - Inventory turnover rate is defined as the dollar value of annual sales (or issues) divided by the dollar value of the inventory level. Inventory level is further defined as the average of the beginning and ending inventory levels for each time period not including those portions of inventory levels with retention policies in support of war reserve requirements and those items mandated for retention by Service/Agency policies. Do not consider direct vendor deliveries on either side of the equation (sales or inventory levels).

Issue Process - Issue process begins with receipt of a material release order (MRO) and ends when material is offered to transportation for distribution to customers. The process includes picking or pulling material from storage or directly from transportation; inspection; cleaning; preserving; packaging; palletizing; preparation for shipment; preparation of any required documentation; and data entry. For supply and storage activities at the "installation" level, the issue process may end when material is placed in customer bins for pickup or handed directly to a customer when the storage facility is co-located with the customer, instead of when it is offered to transportation.

Maximum Potential Capacity - For purposes of S&S Capacity considered unbounded. For each function the most significant limiting factor on capacity is the number of resources available. In the case of supply, an activity may hire additional resources as required to accommodate increased supply demands. For storage resources can be arbitrarily increased to meet increased storage requirements through buying, leasing or building additional storage facilities. There are no limitations to distribution capacity that may not be remedied by the acquisition or use of additional resources (e.g., buying/leasing more trucks, utilizing additional airports or ports, running more trains, etc.)

Military Departments - The Military Departments are the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, which includes the Marine Corps, and Department of the Air Force.

Military Installation - A base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Analysis - An analysis conducted to evaluate an installation's disposal decisions in terms of the environmental impact. The NEPA analysis is useful to the community's planning efforts and the installation's property disposal decisions. It is used to support DoD decisions on transferring property for community reuse.

Nonstocked Item (DoD) - A nonstocked item is defined as an item that does not meet the stockage criteria for a given activity, and therefore is not stocked at the particular activity.

Number of Issues Processed Per Person - The number of issues processed per person is defined as the number of issues processed over the time period given divided by the number of personnel performing issuing functions. In determining number of personnel performing issuing functions, include the total of all Government civilian, military and support contractor personnel

assigned to perform issuing tasks. Express the number of personnel as full-time equivalents (FTEs).

Open Contracts - Open contracts are those that are not physically complete or not eligible for close-out procedures for any portion of each fiscal year. Include purchase orders and delivery orders in the total number of contracts.

Permanent Covered Storage - Permanent covered storage space includes permanent Government-owned facilities and excludes transitory, temporary and commercially leased facilities. Covered storage space includes general purpose warehouses, controlled humidity warehouses, refrigerated (freeze & chill) storage space, flammable/hazardous storage spaces, sheds, magazines and spaces for classified materials and materials requiring special controls. For bulk fuel Activities, provide the total gallons of wet tank storage space instead of net cubic feet of covered storage space.

Potential Reutilization and/or Disposal Materiel - Component materiel identified by an item manager for possible disposal but with potential for reutilization; or (2) materiel that has the potential for being sent by an item manager to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service for; (a) possible reutilization by another DoD Component or by a Federal, State, or local government agency; or for disposal through sale to the public.

Potential Security Assistance Materiel - Materiel that supports weapon systems phased out, or in the process of being phased out, of use by the Department of Defense but temporarily held for programs authorized by the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," as amended (40 USC.512(a)), and the "Arms Export Control Act of 1976," as amended (DoD 4160.21-M-1), or other related statutes by which Department of Defense provides materiel by grant, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of National policies and objectives. It is a memo entry subset of Contingency Retention Stock.

Primary Inventory Control Activity (PICA) - PICA is defined as a code indicating the principal supply control activity responsible for establishing and controlling stockage objectives, and for maintaining item accountability for an item of supply.

Principal Item - An end item or a replacement assembly of such importance to operational readiness that management techniques require centralized individual item management throughout the supply system to include items stocked at depot level, base level, and using unit level.

Realignment - Includes any action that both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.
Redevelopment authority In the case of an installation to be closed or realigned under the BRAC authority, the term "redevelopment authority" means an entity (including an entity established by a State or local government) recognized by the Secretary of Defense as the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation or for directing the implementation of such plan.

Receipt Processing Time - Receipt processing time is the elapsed time from turnover of materiel from a carrier until the on-hand balance of the accountable stock record file, or the in-process receipt file is updated to reflect the received materiel as an asset in storage, or the materiel is issued directly from receiving to a customer. For bulk fuels, receipt processing time is the elapsed time from the termination of the product receipt until the on-hand balance of the accountable stock record file is updated.

Redevelopment Plan - In the case of an installation to be closed or realigned under the BRAC authority, the term “redevelopment plan” means a plan that (A) is agreed to by the local redevelopment authority with respect to the installation; and (B) provides for the reuse or redevelopment of the real property and personal property of the installation that is available for such reuse and redevelopment as a result of the closure or realignment of the installation.

Reparables - Items that are designed for repair at depot level or that are designated for repair below depot level. If repair cannot be accomplished below depot level, the unserviceable carcasses will either be forwarded to a depot for repair or condemnation or reported to the inventory control point (ICP) for disposition. These items will be classified as Class IX.

Secondary Item - An item that is not defined as a principal item and includes repairable components, subsystems, and assemblies, consumable repair parts, bulk items and material, subsistence, and expendable end items, including clothing and other personal gear.

Secretary of Defense Transformation - According to the Department’s April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance document, transformation is “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”

Stocked Items - Stocked items are defined as authorized stockage levels. For Navy, stocked items are carried, and non-stocked items are not-carried. For all, demands are defined as line items, not quantity ordered.

For example:

How to compute Number of Demands Received:

NSN 1234-01-567-8900

One customer order for 10 each

Second customer order for 1 each

Third customer order for 3 each

NSN 1111-01-222-3456

One customer order for 3 each

Second customer order for 4 each

If this were the entire universe of stock numbers managed by the Supply and Storage Activity, the Number of Demands Received equals 5.

Supply and Storage Activities - Supply and storage Activities are those separate units, organizations and activities that have as their primary mission, the provision of supply and/or storage services in support of customer organizations. These services include receiving, storing, issuing and distributing supplies and materiel. The services also include materiel management, stock control, materiel acquisition, disposal and reutilization. Supply and storage Activities are further categorized as shown below:

Above Installation Activities: Those supply and storage Activities that procure, hold and manage materiel not specific to individual operating units. These Activities typically manage inventory, which is held for sale, redistribution or production and are generally considered “wholesale” in nature. National level Inventory Control Points (ICPs) are included in this category.

Installation and Below Activities: Those supply and storage Activities that support organizational level needs for supplies and materiel. Customer organizations of these Activities are typically specific ships, squadrons, wings, battalions and repair shops. These Activities are generally considered “retail” activities.

Surge - No DoD surge requirement was available or provided for the Group to factor into the capacity analysis. Despite this fact the Group felt that surge was an important factor in providing a sensitivity analysis as a means of mitigating risk that may arise from increasing requirements on systems with no additional infusion of resources. The Group believes this requirement-based definition of surge was more useful in determining true excess capacity than arbitrarily changing current usage resource levels to unsustainable levels.

Tons of Material Shipped Per Person - The tons of material shipped per person is defined as the total tons of material shipped over the time period divided by the number of personnel performing shipping functions over the same time period. In determining number of personnel performing shipping functions, include the total of all Government civilian, military and support contractor personnel. Express the number of personnel as full-time equivalents (FTEs).

United States - The 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

War Reserve Materiel - Mission essential secondary items; principal and end items computed as part of the acquisition process; and munitions authorized for sustainability planning in Secretary of Defense Planning Guidance. In the SSIR, secondary items classified as War Reserve Materiel are shown as a memo entry subset of the Approved Acquisition Objective.

Warehouse Location Accuracy Rate - Warehouse location accuracy rate shows the ratio of correct warehouse locations vs. the total number of warehouse locations surveyed.

Warehousing - Warehouse Management operations require bringing together the proper mix of equipment, space, people, practices, technology, and performance measures to create the lowest-cost solution that meets or exceeds service requirements and customer expectations. The Warehouse Management activity includes but is not limited to the following topics: Flexible

Warehouse Design, Warehouse Management System (WMS), Storage, Handling/Movement, Equipment.